A Tale of Countries A and B in Japan’s Security Debate

Watching the Diet deliberations today yielded a rather surprising installment in the long running security legislation performance (some may say surrealist tragicomedy) being played out in Japan’s parliament.

(A国とB国、時々C国の物語 or the Tale of Countries A and B, Occasionally C, if you will. I don’t think Country D has made an appearance yet…)

The opposition was yet again focusing its energies on Minister of Defense Nakatani Gen who has been found in contradiction of fellow members of the ruling parties as well as his past self on more than one occasion.

The DPJ’s Fukuyama Tetsuro was working through a number of scenarios around when Japan would be able to invoke its right to self-defense (NB: none of these situations were predicated on the concerned scenarios and activities taking place within the territory of another nation).

Situation A: Fighter jets from Country A are attacking Japan. These platforms are being provisioned with fuel or weapons from other vessels/planes from the military of Country A. Does Japan have the right to invoke self-defense against the provisioning platforms of Country A in addition to the attacking platforms?

Answer: Yes (of course).

Situation B: Warship from Country A is attacking Japan. This vessel is being provisioned with fuel or weapons from a civilian vessel. Does Japan have the right to invoke self-defense against such civilian provisioning platforms?

Answer: Yes.

Situation C: Fighter/warship from Country A is attacking Japan. This plane/vessel is being provisioned with fuel or weapons from a plane/vessel from Country B. Does Japan have the right to invoke self-defense against provisioning platforms of Country B?

Answer: Yes, right?

No, because, apparently, Country B is only providing rear area support and not engaging in the use of force. Apparently only against Country A’s platforms would the use of force be justified. Confirmed by both Minister of Defense Nakatani and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.


Because the provisioning comes from the military of another, non-attacking country, then this is special?

Japan would have to sit back and allow Country B to keep provisioning Country A until Country A runs out of attacking platforms?

Of course, the issue for the government here is that in another situation Japan could well be Country B. And admitting that such an action would constitute a hostile action indistinguishable from any other use of force to the point of justifying a counter-attack against the provisioning platform would suggest that Japan’s new security legislation would a) indeed allow Japan to engage in hostile acts/use of force by means of direct military support of an allied nation assailing another nation, and b) would suggest that Japan’s SDF would indeed be at risk of being engaged in direct hostilities due to this legislation.

First, how incredibly naive is it to think that a country would hold off attacking Japan’s provisioning platforms because of some self-defined, self-binding Japanese constitutional interpretive peculiarity? I am sure the government doesn’t believe this, but requires a certain suspension of disbelief for others.

Second, I thought this reversal of the hypothetical situation was the gotcha that Fukuyama was building up to, but Fukuyama was one step ahead (of me at least) and had done his homework, homework that suggests there is a good reason for my surprise.


One LDP foreign minister from times past is on record from 1999 saying that, from the general point of view, the use of force based on Japan’s inherent right to self-defense would be justified against a third country B if it was engaging in rear area activities that constituted an integral part of the use of force/hostile acts committed by Country A. As you would expect.

Now this minister was not simply a relic from the past to tossed away like so many other interpretations, principles and officials, but one current LDP Vice President Komura Masahiko: AKA the godfather of the current set of security bills.

And for good measure, Fukuyama had Nakatani on record as saying precisely the opposite just last month (Apologies for the dubious photography).


This has been a security debate of surreal proportions already. And to be fair, this has been a characteristic of both sides of the debate. But this assertion/distinction could have real implications if not clarified or better explained in the days ahead as I dare hope it will be. Otherwise, in the eagerness to adopt collective self-defense and justify military activities further afield than the East Asia region that directly impacts upon Japan’s security, and make these somehow fit within the current constitutional framework, the Abe government may have just narrowed the range of applications of Japan’s inherent individual self-defense rights.

More on the South China Sea

After previous South China Sea interviews here and here, I also had a nice chat with Ken Moritsugu from AP regarding the South China Sea in the middle of month just before top SDF officials and the Japanese MOD started talking more about the “possibility” of Japan taking on a more prominent military role in the South China Sea.

Is Japan really getting involved?

Certainly the current Japanese government seems to be seriously considering this as a possibility, but my sense at this point in time is that it is about strategic signalling more than a commitment. The Japanese government has most notably upped the tempo of its military cooperation with the Philippines with the Philippines and Japanese militaries this year engaging in their first ever maritime joint training exercises in areas of the South China Sea. President Aquino’s latest visit saw the two countries discussing the possibility that Japan and the Philippines would consider an Visiting Forces Agreement where the MSDF could use Philippines’ facilities and maybe even have a rotating presence. The two countries have also agreed to upgrade their strategic partnership further and sign an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment. In addition, a Japanese defense minister made a symbolic visit Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam in 2013, and we have seen formerly more cautious Southeast Asian players like Malaysia and Indonesia looking to cooperate with Japan in explicitly defense-focused areas.

In what form?

I imagine at first it will simply be an increased presence in the region in terms of regularised joint training exercises and perhaps temporary use of bases. Increased intensity in cooperation associated with humanitarian assistance and disaster response will enhance operational familiarity and that in itself could be significant. In terms of traditional military exercises, Japan will likely concentrate in the near future on ways that it can enhance maritime situational awareness and surveillance of its SCS partners. In terms of joint patrols, Japan will likely get involved if other players, perhaps Australia, India or other ASEAN nations, also participate. I think there will be some reluctance within the broader foreign policy establishment in Japan if it was only Japan and the United States conducting joint patrols. A wider regional community response would give these operations greater legitimacy at home among the public.

How big a change in Japan’s postwar security policy would venturing into the SCS be?

I think it would depend on the type of response. If this was singularly a US-Japan-focused response involving Japan in physical maritime patrols or “freedom of navigation” operations using MSDF ships, then this would indeed represent a significant change in terms of Japan proactively projecting power into the South China Sea directly through the alliance mechanism. If it was framed in terms of a US-led Southeast Asian community response with various players involved, then in many ways it could be understood as a logical progression of Japan’s contributions to regional maritime security activities starting with anti-piracy activities in the 1990s.
A lot of this will depend on how long current tensions in the SCS persist, however. If, as some analysts have argued, China is upping the tempo this year ahead of the likely unfavourable Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in its dispute with the Philippines, but then intends to pulls back after that, then such Japanese involvement in SCS military operations may not come to fruition. If tensions continue or intensify in the coming years, then Japanese involvement may become inevitable.

There is a domestic factor to consider as well in that the Abe administration will likely need to go slow after passing any security legislation – even if they succeed they are likely to take a bit of a hit in terms of popularity. This may also be true in coming years if Abe and the LDP are serious about any constitutional change to Article 9.

Is this a good idea? Japan-China relations?

My sense is that at this point the Japanese government is engaging in strategic signalling and putting into place the necessary legal and military mechanisms as preparation ahead of making a final decision about whether to get more directly involved later down the track. There is the possibility that it might sour Japan-China relations which are currently improving, but it is also possible that Japan could use the “threat” of greater involvement in the South China Sea as leverage against China in tensions around the Senkaku Islands.

Related to this, and ultimately the key problem for the Japanese government, however, is that Japan does have very limited military resources to commit in terms of taking up a large role in the South China Sea at this point. The MSDF may be able to spare some capacity for air-based ISR activities, but beyond that I would be cautious about expecting too much unless we see an improvement in government finances and/or an increase in the military budget.


Japan’s Security Legislation (SCMP response)

Large sections originally in response to interview request for article: How ready is Japan to send its troops into battle after 70 years out of the firing line? Subsequently edited for clarity, expanded upon, and appended.

Also see Japan Times Article here for other comments on the security legislation (by @jljzen).

Next Steps for the SDF? 

First of all, the legislation has passed the House of Representatives but there still will be deliberations in the House of Councillors up until mid- to late-September. The government does control the upper house, or House of Councillors, but there are slightly different dynamics that could still collude to change the nature of the bills (see below).

That said, if the current legislation passes the House of Councillors in the exact form it is in now, then it is possible that we will see the SDF taking on expanded roles in “out of area” operations in the near future (ie beyond East Asia). Boiling it down, the legislation collectively will allow the SDF to get closer than ever before to front-line action of any military operations in the Middle East undertaken by the US or the UN. The SDF will not necessarily be able to proactively engage in hostilities on the front line of any conflict, but it will be able to provide various types of logistical and rear area support that blur even further the distinction between combat and non-combat zones that has structured SDF engagement abroad since the 1990s. And this is precisely what has been most controversial in the Japanese political discourse around the security bills, and the vagueness of the legislation itself on what precisely the SDF might do in any such operations has amplified this controversy.

I do think, however, more than Japan suddenly pursuing a significant overseas military footprint, the biggest practical change will be the enhancement of the working of the US-Japan alliance in the Northeast Asia region. The alliance has been moving towards greater integration for more or less 40 years for both Japan’s individual security and for regional security. This legislation will enhance this development and make it explicit that Japan’s SDF does have an important support role to play in regional military contingencies that also involve the United States.  North Korea and Taiwan (just quietly) are the most likely points of focus. The South China Sea may be another, although it seems that this is contingent on developments further down the line. Previous legislation in the late-1990s had made limited provisions for such regional roles, but as Japan’s individual security and regional security have become more intimately connected, the two governments are looking to relax further the restrictions placed on regional military cooperation during the 1990s.

I think in the short-term any further novel policy discussion arising from these bills will look at whether Japan should take on a greater military role in the South China Sea in concert with the US. This is still unsettled and, in terms of Japan’s military strategy, this would be a discrete and novel development that could arise out of these bills. A lot of other developments will be more explicit and strengthened versions of changes to Japan’s security posture and defense doctrine that started being implemented from the beginning of the DPJ administration.

Is the SDF ready to take on an expanded role?

While there is a consensus among Japanese defense and security policymakers that the SDF needs more legal flexibility, there are some internal reservations about the degree to which Japan can realistically expand its commitments beyond its largely self-defense-oriented posture. Japan certainly has relative military strengths in some capability areas, but the SDF is not really configured for sustained expeditionary operations that the US regularly undertakes globally, and it is not sufficiently resourced to consider greatly expanding this capability set. Without a quite significant increase in defense spending (well beyond the 1% of GDP “limit”), it is unlikely to be so configured in the future, either.

In fact, there may be worries that if Japan became more involved in the South China Sea or the Middle East, for example, this could undermine Japan’s focus on defensive deterrence at home. Germany is in some ways instructive for Japan – from the 1990s, Germany focused on developing its expeditionary capabilities and has let its more traditional defense capabilities and its military readiness at home atrophy somewhat, along with many other NATO members. Germany dispatched combat troops to Afghanistan, and now even its expeditionary capabilities have become severely degraded. With Russia becoming more menacing in Europe, this change in defensive orientation has subsequently been questioned, especially given how badly US and NATO intervention in the Middle East proceeded. The Germans are now resolving,at least, to address this issue. Of course, it is not necessarily an either/or problem, but Japanese policymakers are wary of over-commitment.

Is Japan psychologically ready for overseas combat?

Despite foreign fantasies of a samurai deeply and surreptitiously stirring in the Japanese collective psyche, no, Japan is not psychologically ready. This applies to both the SDF and its social contract with its citizens and the families of SDF members, and in terms of wider public sentiment. And despite the problems with government explanations and controversies surrounding these bills, it is unlikely that we will see Japan participating in any “wars” or overseas combat operations any time soon. Certainly these bills increase the risk that Japan may inadvertently get caught up in overseas conflict, and to deny otherwise as the government has is irresponsible, but the SDF’s overseas military footprint will remain far more restrained than even that which Germany has embraced in the post-Cold War era, notwithstanding severe changes in either the regional or global security environment. A significant reason for this is because of public opinion in Japan. While governments can override public opinion in terms of legislative preferences, as has happened in parliamentary proceedings in Japan recently, they do need sustained support for actually deploying troops overseas.

The Abe administration will certainly suffer some damage from passing the legislation. And we need to remember this is not over yet and it could well suffer more damage. For the first time we have seen the approval and disapproval percentages reversed in multiple Japanese opinion surveys.(Update: Appears that was an understatement – Kyodo reports a 10% drop in support ratings for the Abe cabinet to 37% approval, 51% disapproval, although the Olympic Stadium announcement was not included)

In terms of time, there will be another month or more of deliberations in the upper house. This in itself could lead to further leakage of support for the Abe administration, even if no further problems arise. The other key point is that LDP members in the House of Councillors have traditionally been a lot more independent, and if the House of Councillors’ LDP and coalition party Komeito members get concerned about public opinion, then this could cause trouble for the Abe administration. Some will be up for election mid-2016, after all.

This could lead to either one of a few things. First, the upper house refuses to vote on it and leaves the bill as it is, effectively rejecting the bill. This would force the lower house to pass it with a 2/3rds majority, making for even greater controversy. The other thing that could happen is that the LDP comes to an accommodation with opposition parties, particularly the Japan Innovation Party, and scales back some of the most controversial aspects of the legislation. This would likely mean out of area operations would remain similarly restricted as they are now, although such a bill would still enable the enhancement of US-Japan military cooperation regionally.

The bills may still pass as they are, of course. It really depends on how much political capital Abe wants to spend, and how important it is to him to have the legislation passed in the form it is now.

Extra comment

Abe could twist the arms of LDP-Komeito House of Councillors’ members and have them push through the legislation as it is, or just simply override the HoC. But this will come at a cost. Abe, however, is a particularly determined politician. The obvious choice for any other premier would be to preserve their political capital and come to an accommodation with the moderate elements of the LDP and opposition parties. This would play much better with the public, and Abe could still get a significant amount of what he wants if he so chose to go down this path.

Abe is motivated by various senses of commitment, however.

First, he wishes to see Japan play a greater military role on the global stage, not just regionally, believing that this will enhance Japan’s status among the great powers, and accommodating even his moderate critics would likely undermine the implementation and realisation of this preference. Second, he has to some degree made a rod for his back in promising the US in Congress that he would pass the legislation that he submitted to the Diet. Given how committed Abe is to the alliance, at least symbolically, then he probably feels personally responsible for delivering on the legislation to maintain face.

Third, Abe et al are likely thinking strategically and long-term. There are elements of attempts at なし崩し (chipping away, or in vernacular of security studies, “salami slicing”) about this legislation in the sense that it attempts to not only expand on Japan’s commitments to the US alliance, but also to undermine the operational norms that have restricted even Japan’s post-1970s security policy, such as avoiding the direct use of force and deploying troops to engage in hostilities inside, or occupation of, other nation’s territories (thus becoming a legal belligerent to an international conflict). While it is highly unlikely that the SDF will be doing any of these any time soon, the government has been sufficiently evasive and vague about precisely what the SDF might do in the most extreme scenarios. In responses to questions in parliament, Abe and his ministers have tried to assure the public that is not what the bills are designed to do or permit, but at the same time other responses have suggested that they may not be 100% committed to such assurances. In particular, the government has eschewed using terms like “cannot” or “is not allowed” in reference to continued limitations on SDF overseas activities, in favour of “will not” or “is not in mind.” Clearly this does not completely close off future changes, although even Abe himself has noted on more than one occasion that constitutional revision is now the only option left for further expanding the allowable range of the SDF’s overseas activities.

Japan to conduct maritime and aerial patrols over the South China Sea?

Below are some lightly edited remarks provided to the ever-busy Justin McCurry, writing for the Christian Science Monitor on recent suggestions that Japan may take up a great military role in the South China Sea, here.

The prospect of greater SDF involvement in the SCS has been on the radar for a number of years, but I see the timing of bringing this up as being connected to progress on the US-Japan Revised Guidelines. Greater integration of regional operational activities between the US and Japan will be the likely outcome of the negotiations over the revised guidelines that will be finalized sometime this year.

Japan responding favourably to Admiral Thomas’ statement will demonstrate its commitment to increased “burden sharing” in East Asia through the US-Japan alliance; but I would still imagine this will not be a big focus of the negotiations and debate of security issues in the first half of this year. It is likely to be more of a long-term possibility. I don’t think it is posturing, and Prime Minister Abe and Minister of Defense Nakatani Gen would jump at the opportunity if they had the chance – but it is likely that there is an appreciation that the SDF taking on this role may not go ahead soon if debate over Japan’s security legislation gets particularly heated later this year.

In terms of regional reactions, clearly China will not react well – but I don’t think the PRC will change its behavior one way or another in response to this. I see no evidence that China would dial down its own activity in the region in regards to its territorial tensions with Philippines and Vietnam if the US or Japan were to pull back. In terms of the reaction of ASEAN nations, if Japanese patrols were initially very modest and within the operational framework of the alliance, I expect most ASEAN nations to be unconcerned, and Vietnam and the Philippines will welcome it. An independently acting Japan would be a different prospect, however, but that is not practically possible and is not really what the discussion is about at this point in time.

There are concerns, however, that the Abe administration is being unnecessarily provocative in even mentioning this.

On the face of it, it may indeed look unnecessary and inflammatory. And it is possible that US and Japanese leaders and officials may still judge it to be too inflammatory at a point in time when Japan is trying to improve relations with the PRC.

But if at some point “patrols” in the SCS do go ahead, the issue can be looked at from a wider view than just that of the Sino-Japanese relationship.

Certainly Japan does not have any direct territorial interests in the SCS, but Japan’s own national security will be greatly affected by any instability and conflict in the SCS, making it a legitimate stakeholder. Few countries anywhere are as dependent on regional maritime approaches as Japan is for both its resources and its income. For this reason, Japan has already been playing a security role in the region for some time, through its anti-piracy initiatives in region cooperating with littoral ASEAN nations. It has also been a critical part of the response to natural disasters in the region. It is likely that Japan would not be patrolling the region in an independent fashion at this point in time, and it will be cooperating with the US and perhaps the Australian navies, especially now that Australian warships have embedded with the 7th Fleet.

One thing to keep in mind, however, is whether Japan can in practical terms commit to more than just symbolic cooperation in the SCS. A larger commitment of resources could potentially lead to strategic vacuums opening up elsewhere closer to Japan itself, which is still the SDF’s primary responsibility. Without significantly greater investment in the defense budget, Japan’s power projection capabilities will remain modest. There is a great risk of overextending the MSDF in particular, which may not be strategically very wise. This has been an issue with conservatives like Koizumi and Abe – they have big strategic plans for the SDF and the alliance but they do not always appreciate the strategic and resource risks inherent in widening the range of roles and the geographic scope of operations that Japan’s defense officials do.

That said, the Japanese government is quite sensitive about the possibility of there being a future weakening of US commitment to the region in general, and even a symbolic commitment will allow Japan to start to position itself better in the regional strategic order should the US’ strategic rebalance stagnate in the future.

IS and Japan

Taking my lead from a true pro, in lieu of blog postings, I will from time to time post my thoughts on some current events prompted by media enquiries. These will be rough with minimal light editing. 
The Japanese government will not pay a publicised ransom payment, but based on prior practice, the Japanese government may consider back-channel negotiations. The major problem for any possible ransom payment in this particular case is the nature of IS itself. The US-led campaign is slowly undermining IS’ military and financial well being and this threat to Japan might be a sign of desperation. Any Japanese financial contribution to this could, however, have the impact of enabling IS to continue its brutal oppression in the region as well as directly undermine the US fight against IS. It will also work at cross-purposes against Japan’s own non-military, humanitarian aid to the region that IS seems to be so concerned about. The Japanese government will be in no doubt in this case that paying a sizeable ransom could lead to further instability and atrocities in the region.

Like the Algerian crisis in 2013, this crisis does further highlight Japan’s vulnerability to global terrorism. But in some important ways this case is quite different from the Algerian case. The Japanese public in the past has been much less forgiving of individuals who have sought to place themselves in direct conflict zones, while the Algerian situation will be seen as a direct attack on Japan’s citizens and national interests. Even in reaction to this very brazen attack in Algeria, the Japanese government only went as far as strengthening its ability to use military transportation to evacuate citizens. I’d be inclined to think that if the Algerian attack did not rouse the Japanese public and enable the passing of more substantive security legislation, then this event may not be a game changer.

In practical terms, it is unclear what the Japanese government can do in this situation since it does not have the legal or military capability to undertake special forces or other military operations in the Middle East. Aside from the very unlikely possibility that the US and NATO partners have the necessary intelligence to mount a rescue operation on Japan’s behalf, Japan can do little but express support diplomatically for the fight against terrorism. Looking forward, the best option may be for the Japanese government strengthen the working relationship between the SDF and NATO militaries as it has already sought to do over the last three to four years, since Japan is not likely to build the necessary power projection capabilities any time soon.

Domestic Repercussions

If the two men are executed, then immediate anger will probably strengthen Abe’s argument in the short-term that Japan needs to be more mindful of the international nature of threats to Japan’s security and the need to cooperate with the US and its allies.

If Japan had of been providing military aid to the region, then the narrative might have been different, and it could have hurt Abe. The fact that Japan was providing humanitarian aid and was still targeted will suggest that IS is a particularly dangerous and implacable adversary to the Japanese public. But I doubt that Japan will do much more than provide additional non-military and infrastructure aid at this point in response to the possible tragedy.

However, it will almost certainly inject energy and controversy into the drafting of Japan’s new security legislation later this year. Already, subsequent to the 2014 December election, the Komeito had extracted general commitments in negotiations from the LDP to effectively limit the geographic scope of new so-called “collective self-defense” legislation. Those who are already inclined to see any Japanese coordination with foreign militaries as a negative will see this as evidence of why Japan should continue to be circumspect about taking on a higher military profile, while those wanting to see a higher military profile will see this as evidence that Japan cannot afford to sit back and hope other nations can take care of Japan’s security and interests. It will be a source of controversy, which will probably be unwelcome for Abe as Abe lacks the political skill of Koizumi when it comes to managing the public on highly controversial issues of broad public concern such as Japan’s overseas military presence.

In the long-term, as the anger in Japan subsides, it could complicate the passage of defense legislation later this year if that legislation raises the possibility of Japan providing significant military aid to US and NATO operations in the Middle East. While the Japanese public is slowly becoming more comfortable with the SDF and the US military playing an increased role together in (East Asian) regional security, they are still very sceptical about some Japanese politicians’ claims that the Middle East also represents a pressing concern for Japan’s security requiring a Japanese military response, other than perhaps for protecting sea lanes from pirates. Komeito was probably the big winner from the recent election, and insiders have suggested this meant that one of more contentious pieces of legislation – Japanese minesweeping during an ongoing conflict (possibly in the Middle East) – will probably be off the table later this year. I wouldn’t be surprised if the long-term consequences on CSD legislation were minimal, especially since CSD operations have little to do with what might be required in the current situation.

There has been chatter that Abe might want to let the hostages die, as this might help his agenda for revising the constitution.
Leaving aside the cynicism inherent in such a suggestion, if the arguably more serious Algerian situation did not rouse the Japanese public to support changes allowing direct Japanese military intervention, it seems unlikely that this particular situation will galvanise it. The media impact of this event might be greater than Algeria, but as time passes, concern may subside.

Furthermore, the types of constitutional changes to Article 9 that could pass the Diet and public opinion at this point in time will fall far, far short of allowing high profile rescue operations inside the territory of other nations.

Not too early to start thinking about the 2016 election?

Overall, I generally agree with MTC and Tobias Harris that while this election looks like a thumping victory, it may not necessarily enhance Abe’s ability to implement the third arrow of Abenomics and national security and constitutional changes. It will, however, have a positive short-term impact upon Abe’s ability to continue to implement the first two arrows of Abenomics relating to fiscal spending and changing the basis of taxation (particularly the corporate tax), and the continuation of BOJ-led monetary easing.

I perhaps differ a little with MTC in that I would say that the gamble has paid off, although only just. If nothing else, Abe has two more years, which if he uses it wisely and patiently (a big assumption in itself) in terms of issue selection, could result in eventual success.

He is also less likely to face a challenger in September election. A poor result in the election would have made that almost inevitable, and he has avoided this humiliation.

Now, an even more disastrous downturn in the economy or demonstration of administrative incompetence is probably required in order for a genuine challenger to emerge. Prior to Abe calling the election, the simple eating away of Abe’s support rate ahead of the 2015 LDP presidency election (as was already taking place), and the prospect of a 2016 HoR-HoC double election, would have been enough to stimulate significant concern within the LDP and a challenger. Now the House of Representatives members of the LDP will be somewhat calmed. But nine months is still a longtime, and Ishiba Shigeru waits in the wings should something unexpected take place.

I do feel, given expectations around an even more dominating victory, that Abe may have lost a little bit of momentum, nonetheless. While much has been made of the low turnout rate, it is also important to note, as MTC does, that the LDP’s PR percentage was merely a third of all votes. Expectations were that the LDP would get around 40 percent of the vote in PR at the very least. Also important to note is that the LDP’s victories in the single-member districts (SMDs) were even more dependent on the Komeito than was previously the case, which will give LDP leaders pause.

Indeed, the real winners of the election were:


While Komeito increased the number of seats by four, compared to a LDP three-seat loss, more important was the effective elimination of two alternative parties (Your Party and the Next Generation Party) that Abe would most likely use in any intra-coalition power play to chasten a recalcitrant Komeito on security issues in particular. Furthermore, MTC estimates in the context of low voter turnout that the LDP may have been reliant on Komeito for up to 25 percent of its SMDs’ votes. If low voter turnout is going to be the new norm in Japan, then attempts to bludgeon Komeito into submission through threats of coalition dissolution will have even less credibility.

The Japan Innovation Party

In its former incarnation, the JRP was also a party that Abe could use in the manner articulated above. However, with the separation from Ishihara and merger with Eda Kenji’s Your Party offshoot, the party has embraced a more moderate, reform orientated and urban-focused party image and policy platform not so dissimilar to the original DPJ. While Hashimoto still sees areas of cooperation with Abe, incentives point in the opposite direction (as discussed below). In any respect, Hashimoto declining to run in this election enhances Eda Kenji’s leadership of the party in the Diet. With the arch-conservative Party for Future Generations being essentially obliterated, and the more moderate JIP holding its own in the PR segment of the vote, then this election may well have consolidated JIP’s electoral relevance and pointed the way to a sustainable strategy for political positioning. And as one of Abe’s ulterior motives for the election was the effective elimination of the electoral relevance of other non-left parties, then victory can be declared in the JIP only losing one seat overall.

The Japan Communist Party

The JCP came close to tripling its representation. While it may be tempting to portray the JCP as really being a principled social democratic party with an unusual relic of a name, until we see any sort of engagement with policymaking, and cooperation and compromise (god-forbid) with other non-LDP parties, then I am reluctant to ascribe much relevance to this development. But 13 more communists will collect a solid salary than prior to the election. That said, the JCP will now be able to submit non-budgetary bills to the Diet, so maybe they will prove me wrong. In any respect, a win for the communists (a phrase one does not hear often these days).

The 6人衆

(rokunin-shu – formerly known as the nana-bugyou 七奉行)

The leaders of the so-called “mainstream” of the DPJ not only see Kaieda Banri fail for the second time, leaving the way open for one of their ilk to take over the DPJ leadership, but also lose his seat. This in theory makes realignment much more manageable as members of this grouping (Okada Katsuya, Maehara Seiji, Azumi Jun, Edano Yukio, Gemba Koichiro, Noda Yoshihiko), along with Hosono Goshi, have increasingly been putting out feelers to the JIP after Ishihara and Hashimoto split the JRP.

Implications for realignment

As noted by CFR’s Shelia Smith, this election was a lesson in why it is important for the opposition to present itself as a genuine alternative with its own ideas. This rings especially true when we consider how little success the DPJ and JIP had in Tokyo’s SMDs despite some degree of cooperation and favourable electoral dynamics. Nevertheless, it would surprise me if DPJ-JIP realignment or a merger took place soon, although a Hosono Goshi or Maehara Seiji victory in the January 2015 DPJ elections might change the dynamics somewhat. Currently, I would say Edano and Hosono have the inside running, but the current leadership vacuum in the DPJ could result in almost anything happening.

While the JIP has moved more closely to the mainstream of the DPJ than many have perhaps realised, there is still a key sticking point around labour legislation and labour unions. The fact that the JIP did better than many expected on the PR ticket suggests that the more moderate strategy has the potential to work, and also means that it will likely not be absorbed into the DPJ as a rump party. Hashimoto was disappointed by the election result, but his political relevance has not been obliterated by the election as many expected. In fact, with the 2016 House of Councillors election, there is an even greater chance that the JIP can establish itself as a genuine political force. Not only can it represent itself as the non-Rengo beholden alternative to the LDP and eat into the LDP’s base, especially if third arrow reforms stagnate ahead of 2016, but the JIP has a great chance to radically eat into the DPJ’s House of Councillors seat tally. In 2016, 41 out of the current 58 DPJ House of Councillors candidates will be up for election. Remember, the DPJ lost 27 out of the 44 seats it had up for election in the first post-DPJ government election in 2013, with many going to the JRP, Your Party, and some going back to the LDP. Furthermore, the electoral system for the House of Councillors (as it currently stands) provides less incentive for a formal amalgamation or even cooperation between the two parties in urban areas compared to a House of Representatives election with many SMDs. In 2013, 42 out of the 73 non-PR seats up for grabs were in more urban or suburban multi-member districts, with a further 48 seats distributed on the basis of proportional representation.

If such realignment is going to take place, current logic would suggest the JIP would do well to hold out until after the 2016 election and see where things stand after the dust settles. It may even be able to negotiate realignment from a position of strength without as much consideration of the still electorally influential Rengo. Either way, while one election outcome is that Abe (potentially) has four more years of rule, the opposition has fewer players and four more years to sort itself out.

First take on the LDP’s election prospects

MTC has already covered off the importance of the headline support rates from the post-GDP shock Kyodo and Asahi opinion polls now out. A few more should come over the next few days.

In short, they show loss in faith in Abe, but not a catastrophic reduction in support for either the PM or the LDP at this point. If the election was held today, the likely result would be a pretty solid “victory” with the LDP-Komeito coalition easily getting over the 270 seat mark that LDP and Komeito strategists have identified as the minimum acceptable line for a reduction in the coalition’s House of Representatives majority.

Looking deeper into the Asahi poll (jp) certainly reveals enough doubts about Abe’s policy program that give a glimmer of hope for opposition parties that they may be able to push the coalition a bit harder. That is, at least in comparison with when serious discussion of a snap election first arose a few weeks ago.

Monday’s news on the economy does appear to have hurt Abe when compared to a NTV poll taken just two days prior to the announcement of 3rd quarter GDP figures when it was already clear that the consumption tax would be delayed and an election called. In this pre-Monday poll only 32 percent thought Abenomics had failed, 51 percent didn’t think so (66 percent didn’t think Abenomics was progressing according to another question in the same survey). In the post-Monday Asahi survey, while not an exactly equivalent question, we see failure rising above “success” with 39 percent believing Abe having failed, and 30 percent thinking it was a success, with assumedly 31 percent not sure.

62 percent of Asahi respondents are opposed to the election (18 percent agreeing) and 65 percent (25 percent accepting) said they did not accept Abe’s reasoning for calling the election (to go to the people in regards to delaying the consumption tax). In the Kyodo survey, 63.1 percent said they could not fathom the reason for the election, with 30 percent accepting the reasoning. 66 percent of respondents were opposed to the election in the aforementioned NTV poll, even when framed in terms of a delay in the consumption tax increase.

In terms of Abe saying he would definitely have to put the consumption tax up in April 2017, in the Asahi poll 49 percent did not evaluate positively this assertion, while 33 percent did. In a straight yes or no on putting the tax up in April 2017, 49 percent were against this, and 39 percent were in favour. Abe committing to the 2017 sales tax rise while going to people to get support for the delay and his economic policies will certainly send a confusing message for the public in terms of what kind of mandate he is asking for. One of the big challenges of this election will be how to interpret the results – of course Abe and Suga have their own views on what this election is and is not about – but for the rest of us it is unclear what it is precisely that Abe wants to claim to be able to do post-election (that he could not already do, legally or otherwise).

Perhaps the most encouraging result for the opposition comes from the question on whether the public believed that Abe’s economic policies were actually designed to improve wages and employment opportunities. Only 20 percent said the thought this was directly tied in to his economic policies, while 65 percent said they didn’t think so. This is the narrative that the opposition will increasingly play on during the next 3 weeks, and the bad GDP numbers only help this narrative.

While it may be harder for the opposition to get traction on this, despite its significance IMHO, the Asahi also asked a question relating to reform of the House of Representatives and reduction of its size. Abe agreed in 2012 to the consumption tax legislation and to cutting the House of Representatives before the next election as a symbol of government sacrifice. However, only 5 seats have been reduced to deal with the voter-value disparity (ineffectively, it is already over 2:1 again); equally important is that discussion on the electoral features of a new House of Representatives have only gotten to the stage of agreeing on a third-party mechanism for discussing options. When asked how much of a problem it was that Abe was calling an election before implementing the promised reduction in House of Representatives size, 39 percent of respondent said they thought it was a big problem, and 38 percent said it was problem to a degree.

In terms of the implications of the headline support rates, we will probably see a solid loss of seats in the single member districts (SMDs) by the LDP, but many of those candidates will likely be revived on the PR list. Notwithstanding some exogenous or unexpected event, I would expect to see the LDP gain around 20 to 25 seats on the PR list, picking up the more conservative supporters of parties like the now defunct JRP and Your Party.

According to my own perfunctory analysis on the SMDs, there are 29 districts that the opposition should easily take back from the LDP by the simple act of cooperating with each other, and there are a further 32 SMDs that should be in play if the opposition coordinates and runs a moderately successful campaign. Greater gains in a further 50 or more seats would only be likely if some serious unexpected game changer enters into the election, although in that case I would expect that to also impact upon the PR support rate as well. A lot depends on the opposition coordinating, however, although there are some signs that in some of the key SMD regions some tough decisions (jp) are being made (such as in Tokyo where somehow the LDP managed to win a majority of seats despite its candidates seldom winning more than 35 percent of the votes cast). There are also some signs that some of the more controversial members of the DPJ old guard are retiring, such as Sengoku Yoshito and Tanaka Makiko, which is probably only a benefit for the DPJ. As MTC notes, pretending the Kaieda Banri doesn’t exist might also be of help.

That said, at this stage I would expect the LDP-Komeito coalition to only lose 35 seats (including the five seats that no longer exist).

I hope to refine this analysis over the coming three weeks based on new developments.




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