Big Drop in Support for Abe, Still Considering an Early Election?

Two recent surveys have indicated quite bad news for the Abe cabinet. Particularly so, because the polls overlapped with recognition in the Japanese media that Abe had managed to score a meeting with Xi Jinping at APEC.

First, NHK (n=963; CI=3.2%) showed (日) a drop of 8 percentage points from 52 to 44 percent in Abe’s support rate, with an increase of 4 percentage points in disapproval to 38 percent. This was at the lowest level the NHK had recorded for Abe 2.0. Interestingly, the public is less convinced not only with the implementation and results of Abenomics, but are also becoming sceptical of the policy program itself. 47 percent evaluated Abe’s economic policies positively to at least some degree, while 48 percent were unconvinced to a lesser or greater degree. Only 10 percent said that they could feel a recovery, while 54 percent said they could not, and 33 percent were not sure either way. 77 percent said that to at least some degree they felt that food prices had become a greater burden, while 19 percent said otherwise. With the consumption tax, 20 percent indicated it should go ahead as planned, 41 percent said implementation should be delayed, and 33 percent were simply opposed to an increase.

The Asahi Shimbun (n=1898; CI= 2.2%) also recorded (日) a drop of 7 percentage points compared to its survey taken only two weeks before hand. It’s current level of 42 percent is precisely the same as the level just immediately prior to the cabinet reshuffle in September. Abe’s disapproval was up 6 points to 36 percent, one point higher than September. The LDP also dropped 4 percentage points in support to 33 percent, although this support did not go to any of the other parties. 48 percent now say that they do not support any political party.

The Asahi asked respondents whether they felt their livelihood had improved because of Abe’s economic policies; 4 percent said it had improved, 28 percent said it had gotten worse, and 66 percent said it had not changed. In regards to the consumption tax increase, the Asahi’s question were more straightforward, with 67 percent being opposed and 24 percent in favour. It was 71 percent and 22 percent respectively two weeks prior. There was strong sentiment that a tax rise to 10 percent would be very bad for the public – 84 percent said that they felt concerned that the rise would have a negative impact upon the economy (27 percent saying a significant negative impact), while 13 percent said they did not feel so.

Respondents were also asked about the previous consumption tax increase to 8 percent in April – 70 percent said that to at least some degree they had felt its impact, while 29 percent said otherwise.

The Asahi also ran with the question about the likelihood of respondents continuing to support/not support Abe’s cabinet. There was little change compared to the September poll, with 17 percent of the public appearing to be hardcore Abe supporters, 53 percent being potential Abe supporters, and 22 percent vowing to never support Abe.

For the 42% who support the Abe Cabinet:

I will support the Abe Cabinet from now on

42% (17% of total respondents)

My support for the Abe Cabinet is not guaranteed

55% (23% of total respondents)

For the 36% who do not support the Abe Cabinet:

I will not support the Abe Cabinet from now on

59% (22% of total respondents)

It is possible that I will support the Abe Cabinet 

35% (13% of total respondents)

Despite this, there is still quite vigorous discussion about Abe possibly calling a snap election, to take place before the year is out, especially if he decides to delay the consumption tax rise to 10 percent. This might seem extremely unusual given his now plummeting support rate and the fact that the public does not want to see an election.* It would be seen as a very cynical ploy and there would be questions about exactly what it is Abe would be campaigning on. Future consumption tax rises, turning on nuclear power plants, and a still yet unclear record on improving the economy (at least from the average voter’s point of view)?

The problem is, none of that may matter. As noted above, effectively 2/3rds of the electorate that does not support the LDP do not support any of the other political parties, with the DPJ still hovering around 6 percent support. Furthermore, voters may not have actual real choice to vote against the LDP anyway. While the LDP now has only 5 seats to fill for its 286 Single Members Districts (SMDs), with Komeito being effectively handed 9 SMDs without LDP competition (total 295 SMD seats), recent reports put the DPJ at less than half of those SMDs having official candidates. Hashimoto’s and Eda Kenji’s party (Ishin no Tō) also have only around 50 candidates at last count and are aiming for around 70 to 80. While Kaieda Banri might be talking tough (日) by daring Abe to call a snap election, if it was called this year then there may be a very large number of SMDs where the most prominent LDP alternative would be the Japan Communist Party.

* In the aforementioned NHK survey 15 percent said they wanted to see an election soon, 26 percent said they thought it should be put off for a while, while 50 percent preferred an election when the current House of Representatives term ends in December 2016.

Back to Square One for Abe?

The last set of posts reported on Abe arresting his declining cabinet support rate, and then reversing the trend after the cabinet reshuffle. A series of “scandals” involving these new cabinet members and financial and electoral improprieties has greatly undermined the working of the new cabinet, and Abe appears to be back where he was in July after the first round of post-CSD declaration polls came in.

Approval: Abe’s Popularity Declines

On the approval side of matters, the change has not been so severe. The polls from TV networks show a 4.8 percent average drop (Figure 1), with the traditional media showing a 6.1 percent drop, for an overall drop of 5.5 percent (Figure 3). For the latter result, however, we see the Nikkei and Yomiuri seeing rather larger drops compared to their rapid reaction polls taken immediately after the cabinet reshuffle (Figure 2). A lesson to be learned there for these two pro-LDP papers, perhaps, as the changes coming from these two polls has magnified  Abe’s drop in approval.* Or it may well suggest that Abe’s increase in approval after the reshuffle was not really as high as initially estimated. Figure 4 shows that the drop in this month overall was as high as the drop that we saw after the Collective Self-Defense decision in July. Whether this is due to the cabinet failings, due to increasing frustration with the lack of progress on various reform measures, or due to the perhaps artificially high post-cabinet reshuffle numbers is another question (Click on figures to see full size).

Figure 1: Cabinet Approval Rates from TV Networks (April to October)

Figure 1: Cabinet Approval Rates from TV Networks (April to October)

Figure 2: Cabinet Approval Rates Traditional Media (April to October)

Figure 2: Cabinet Approval Rates Traditional Media (April to October)

Figure 3: Average Approval Rates of all polls

Figure 3: Average Approval Rates of all polls

Figure 4: Average Change in Approval

Figure 4: Average Change in Approval

Disapproval: Consistent Increases in almost all Polls

On the disapproval side, then there have been perhaps more worrying changes for Abe. Abe’s approval ratings have been bouncing around for a while now as voters appear ambivalent about his policy program. Disapproval seemed to move a little bit less dramatically, however. The last month saw reasonably significant upward movement in Abe’s disapproval after two months of improvement. Last month’s increase in disapproval was more than double the increase in disapproval after the CSD cabinet declaration in July (Figure 8). In this case, the upward trend in disapproval was more or less equally shared among the surveys, although a lack of movement from the Jiji and Asahi polls made this result less bad for Abe (Figure 6).

Figure 5: Cabinet Disapproval TV Networks

Figure 5: Cabinet Disapproval TV Networks

Figure 6: Cabinet Disapproval Traditional Media

Figure 6: Cabinet Disapproval Traditional Media

Figure 7: Cabinet Disapproval Average

Figure 7: Cabinet Disapproval Average

Figure 8: Average Change in Disapproval

Figure 8: Average Change in Disapproval

Abe’s Buffer: Net Support

Nonetheless, Abe has for close to two years managed to maintain a positive net support rate (Figure 9). While the last month was almost as bad as the decrease in his buffer in July (Figure 10), the lack of an effective opposition continues to ensure that he sits in the comfortable position (for a Japanese prime minister) of being more popular than unpopular.

Figure 9: Net Support (Approval subtract Disapproval)

Figure 9: Net Support (Approval subtract Disapproval)

Figure 10: Change over Time of Net Support

Figure 10: Change over Time of Net Support

Election Watch

Nevertheless, with much to do and the government suffering setbacks and the opposition going after the LDP in parliament, Abe has probably missed his chance to call a snap election this year under this cabinet, if this was ever really seriously on the cards at all. He would look like he was running scared and with few real achievements to call upon in campaigning. The LDP would still win, but would unlikely improve its position. If Abe’s reshuffle had seen two to three months of stability and a policy success or two, then a snap election, leading into early December, could have been a possibility. With budget season coming up, Abe and his cabinet tied up in parliamentary proceedings other than policy, it is unlikely that an early election will take place before August next year.

An ideal time for the LDP could be the unified local elections next year after the budget has been passed, something that will be less onerous for the LDP than it was during the DPJ years. However, Komeito is extremely unlikely to support this due to wanting to maximize their organizational resources during two separate campaigns rather than a local and a national one at the same time. After April, the LDP is likely to go into top gear to try and get legislation approved to make good on the commitments made in the US-Japan Revised Defense Guidelines, and any other enabling legislation deriving from the policy commitments noted in the July 1 cabinet declaration on Japan’s seamless defense that the LDP might be confident of getting through. Abe is likely to want to get through what he thinks he can get through reasonably uncontroversially, and then attack more controversial legislation perhaps after an election with a renewed mandate. This could be after the full term has been served, but it also wouldn’t surprise me if a snap election was called in August next year just before Abe goes up for reelection for the LDP leadership, if he is in any condition to contest one or the other of these elections. If Abe is strong, a national election before the LDP election would put him in a strong position to force through a change in LDP rules at some point to allow a third term as president, which would be required for him to serve out the full four years of a new House of Representatives term  and avoid a mandatory change in LDP leader less than one year out from an election (and also allow Abe to just make it all the way to the Olympics if successful again in 2019). If Abe’s position at the time makes him vulnerable to a challenge, this would change the calculus again, however – an election is likely to take place after the LDP election in such a case.

But the way things have been going lately, and with Abe losing his aura of invincibility, these long-term scenarios look much more doubtful than they did even two months ago. And this will make it all the more difficult for him to tackle the already tough issues of nuclear power plant restarts, the consumption tax rise, and making concessions on the TPP.

* The Yomiuri in its polling after the cabinet reshuffle pushed respondents a little bit harder to come down on the side of either approval or disapproval than some of the other survey organizations.

Striking while the Iron is (Very) Hot

In the very quickly put together post-Cabinet reshuffle surveys, both the Nikkei and Yomiuri (日) Shimbun have found 10 percent plus increases in support for Abe. Much of this appears to have to do with the appointment of five women in the cabinet roughly in line with Abe’s goal of having 30 percent of executive positions being occupied by women by 2020, and Abe leaving in place senior politicians such as Aso (consumption tax), Amari (TPP), Suga (everything) and Kishida (diplomacy, getting an APEC date with Xi) with jobs to do in the upcoming 13 months until the 2015 September LDP election.

Kyodo found slightly less dramatic results, but still recorded an increase (日) from 49.8% to 54.9% in cabinet support, and a healthier reduction in disapproval (日) of 10 percent. Mainichi bucked (日) the trend and recorded no change in support rate (47%) and a not particularly significant 2% decrease in disapproval.

Nevertheless, with the Yomiuri finding 64 percent support, and the Nikkei finding 60 percent support for the Cabinet, and 46% and 44% support for the LDP respectively, this will not put the rumours of a snap election to rest. Two surveys taken just prior to the cabinet reshuffle suggest, after all, that both Abe and the LDP will likely never look so good.

When survey organizations in Japan inquire into cabinet support, the follow-up question is usually about why the public supports (or does not) the cabinet. Party support is usually left as it is – a problem when more than 50% of the electorate across surveys is generally undecided about the party that they support. This can give general insights into whether it is policy, party, or personality that is driving up or down support, but is otherwise unhelpful. The Nikkei and the Asahi Shimbun decided to do things a little differently in August. I hope they continue. The Nikkei followed up the usual question on party support by asking the 61 percent of unaffiliated voters who they leaned towards in terms of preferences. Here are the results:

Currently, which political party do you support? (N=1039)

Party support

 

For those who don’t support a party or can’t say/don’t know, if you had to choose one party that you feel some affinity for, please indicate below (n=633)

Party Affinity

Total of party supported/affinity (n=1039)

Combined Affinity Support for Party

With the exception of the 2005 postal reform snap election, the 37 percent is not too far from what the LDP has usually achieved in the proportional representation vote component at election time over the last decade, whether it has done well or not in terms of receiving parliamentary seats. For the LDP to score in the mid-40s in line with the Nikkei and Yomiuri polls is an aberration in many ways if truly indicative. More importantly, there is practically no support, explicit or implicit, for any of the opposition parties. The DPJ seems close to dead as a political brand. They have only identified 131 candidates for the next election to stand in the 295 single member districts. The Unity Party and the JRP still have not settled on a way to work with each other, let alone proceeded on to figuring out an accommodation with the DPJ for contesting the single member districts; settling on an anti-LDP candidate for each of the single member districts is the fundamental priority for the opposition if it wishes to contest an election with the LDP, even an unpopular one, in any meaningful way.

The Asahi just a week before the cabinet change inquired into support for the cabinet. They found only 42% support (n=1581). They went further and essentially asked respondents whether they would be likely to shift their views on supporting/not supporting the cabinet.

For the 42% who support the Abe Cabinet:

I will support the Abe Cabinet from now on

42% (18% of total respondents)

My support for the Abe Cabinet is not guaranteed

52% (22% of total respondents)

For the 35% who do not support the Abe Cabinet:

I will not support the Abe Cabinet from now on

60% (21% of total respondents)

It is possible that I will support the Abe Cabinet 

34% (12% of total respondents)

This would suggest that while 52 percent of respondents either support Abe or would be willing to support him, only 18 percent of the electorate are “hard core” Abe supporters.

If we factor in that on average the Asahi usually finds around 5% less support for the LDP government than other surveys (without passing judgement on which is the “true” figure), then, all other things being equal and normal, a support rate of 55 percent plus should be seen as the maximal, high watermark support rate for Abe at this point in time.

If they are going to go for a snap election, they may as well do it now – notwithstanding it’d probably be seen as too clever by half.

Abe Arrests Deteriorating Support Rate: Still Has Promises to Keep

Please see my introduction to this series. Very Brief “Methodology” Note Here

Find below a brief run down of cabinet support rate data tracked since April 2014 (when the first increment of the consumption tax rise was implemented). Where necessary for the sake of readability, I have split the data from individual polls into two categories – data coming from television organizations in Japan, and those coming from “traditional” print media organizations.

As we can see from the charts below, both television and print organizations recorded an overall downward trend in cabinet approval over the last 5 months, with significant drops from May until and including July being discernible.

Television Organizations – Cabinet Approval

CabsupportTVAugust

 

 Print Media Organizations – Cabinet Support

CabsupportNewspaperAugust

 

 Combined Average Support

CombinedAvesupportaugust

 

Cabinet approval appears to have stabilized or increased between July and August, however. The exact cause of this is hard to discern as no particular issue or event stood out during August. Perhaps the perception of “safe-driving” after Abe de-emphasized the urgency of security changes subsequent to reading the July polls has been a factor.

The overall average trend, nevertheless, reveals an average drop off in cabinet support of six percentage points from 54 percent to 48 percent during the April-August period.

Of interest is that that in July, after the “collective self-defense” cabinet decision, we saw an average of a 5.15 percentage points drop in cabinet support across all polls in a single month, with that month seeing net support for the cabinet drop by 11.14 percentage points across all polls. The average net support (approval minus disapproval) is tracked by month below. We find a general deterioration in the Abe administration’s “support buffer” from April onwards, with the July results suggesting that it might only be a matter of time until disapproval outweighed approval for Abe Cabinet 2.0. August however, was a relatively good month with all but two polls showing an increase in support and net support, and a stabilising of disapproval (also below). Critical to the Abe administration, particularly after the today’s reveal of Abe Cabinet 2.1, will be whether this August trend can be sustained, or at least net approval maintained at around the current rate. Given the perilous state of the opposition, maintaining the current levels of support will deliver to Abe and the LDP victory in any election, thus ensuring Abe remains safe in his role as LDP president. This could be even more important if the long-standing rumours of a snap election in the coming months come true (see Shisaku here for the most recent incarnation).

Combined Net Support

Combined Average Net Support

Combined Average Disapproval

Combined Average Disapproval August

The Perils of Making and Fulfilling Promises

There are still a number of variables than could collude to  upset or even unseat Abe, despite appearing to have arrested the slow decline of his premiership. Abe and his cabinet have been masterful at putting off these issues and thus not antagonizing the public or important stakeholders and constituencies too much over the last 1.75 years.

There are the issues connected to the nuclear power plant restarts, especially with the Fukushima gubernatorial election coming up. Without the restarts, Abe’s goals of stimulating the economy and/or sustaining the (still unconvincing) initial gains from Abenomics will remain subject to the ever present drag of higher cost energy imports, irrespective of what happens with the promised “third arrow” reforms that are supposed to be forthcoming. Okinawa and Futenma relocation facility tensions loom on the horizon.

The decision over the promised, but very unpopular rise in the consumption tax from 8% to 10% will also need to be negotiated (possibly in the ostensible form of making concessions to Komeito taking the tax off necessities and fresh foods – a bureaucrat’s dream come true of little policy sense).

Abe has also raised the stakes around the Sino-Japanese relationship. Can Abe, by foregoing a Yasukuni visit in August, convince Xi Jinping to meet with him at APEC in November? Is Xi waiting to see what Abe’s domestic position is like around November before deciding one way or another? There would, after all, be no point in meeting with Abe if it looks like the PRC can wait him out. Also important to factor in is that Xi not meeting with Abe could, or I would argue is likely to, precipitate another visit to the Yasukuni shrine in December, with unpredictable political consequences for most, except for the CCP and Xi who will look wise and not unreasonable.

2015

The new year will then bring a final agreement on the re-revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines. This will require the Abe government to implement the promises made to the United States as well as fulfil the expectations raised by the July 1 Cabinet decision. This could still be a fraught process (see forthcoming CPI article. Up now).

The new year will likely also bring the TPP back onto the agenda – if Obama somehow manages to acquire “fast-track” authority from Congress, then it is likely a final deal will be done. The implementation will require another promise to be fulfilled to the US (the credibility of the pivot will be greatly enhanced or undermined by having Japan sign off or not on a TPP agreement, even a “compromised” one) as well as to Abe’s most vigorous domestic backers in the form of the Keidanren and corporate Japan.

Throw in Abe’s most long-standing promise – yes, the one that basically launched his career – to bring home or establish the whereabouts of the remaining DPRK abductees. Success of any substantive kind could be a massive coup for Abe, and may even bolster the Abe administration even if the economy worsens or governing becomes distinctly more difficult as described above. Of course, just writing the words “North Korea” and “Kim Jong-un“, and “strained DPRK-PRC relationship”, should be enough to demonstrate why this is a pretty dubious expectation to rely on for Abe to demonstrate leadership and independent diplomatic strength.

So far the Abe administration has been generally masterful in avoiding the big decisions and not alienating itself too much from its supporters and public sentiment. The question is, how long will they be able to get away with this?

 

The Secret Life of a Kiwi PhD Candidate

I will be starting today what I will endeavor to make a monthly feature. Growing out of my PhD, I have been tracking a large amount of polling information over the last few years and further back into the past in regards to Japanese politics and foreign policy. If the data exists, I likely know about it, if not have already worked it into a chart of some sort.

While most of this information and the associated analysis will be kept under wraps for the time being, in an effort to blog at least once a month I will provide a run down of the latest cabinet support rate data from over 11 different survey organizations, and analysis of any other survey questions from the previous month that piqued my interest.

The quality of the analysis will likely be directly correlated with the amount of time I have, but if you have a better take on the data than I do, then please feel free to continue the conversation in the comments.

Very Brief Methodology Note: I am using polls only from organizations that take a nationwide probability sample, preferably using two-stage stratified random sampling methods. These polls generally derive 1000 participants from a population sample, although some organizations such as the Asahi often acquire a sample size of up to 2000. Assuming a minimum sample size of around 900-1000 participants, the confidence interval for these surveys is approximately 2.2 percent at a 95 percent confidence level, and 2.9 percent at a 99 percent confidence level.  Most of these survey organizations’ surveys have participation rates of around 50 percent, which in contemporary surveying is actually quite robust. That said, this does not mean all polls are created equal and I will over time point out those polls which yield results that deviate consistently from the median and average poll results.

Collective Self-Defense and Japan: Readings and Analysis

The big change to Japan’s post-war constitutional fabric announced on July 1 has unsurprisingly brought all sorts of analysts out of the woodwork determined to have their say.

For example, there is myself.

At the risk of deprecating others by putting them in the same category as myself, here are some other notable contributions:

Jeremy Yellen from Harvard

Adam Liff from Princeton-Harvard

Tobias Harris, formerly of MIT, now with Teneo Intelligence (paywalled)

Shelia Smith from CFR

James Schoff, former DoD official and now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

If there is a common theme between these articles it would be that there is still a lot of political water to go under the bridge before anything like the anticipated gains relating to deterrence can be realized, if that is your concern. It would also be remiss of me to not mention that the process undertaken to rework the government’s interpretation of the constitution was less than popular, and of questionable political legitimacy. Bryce Wakefield and Craig Martin provide the most forceful articulations of such a view.

I will also have an article up on East Asia Forum soon (up now here) which will work through the implications of the ‘legalization‘ of Japan’s unique version of collective self-defense assuming that the Abe administration achieves their stated objectives to the fullest extent.

 

 

Abe’s CSD Report and the Political Agenda

The Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (安全保障の法的基盤の再構築に関する懇談会; hereafter the “Panel” or kondankai) has delivered its report to Prime Minister Abe and the NSC. The main focus of the report relates to whether the Japanese government can and should allow itself to exercise the right to collective self-defense currently considered by the Japanese government to be a prohibited form of the use of force to settle an international dispute. I have outlined the general approach that might be used to reconfigure the current constitutional interpretation here.

The key thing to remember is that the kondankai’s recommendations do not carry any legal weight as they are essentially a private advisory body to the Prime Minister. Abe himself has said the report will point to the general policy direction that he intends to take, although the final decision on CSD and constitutional reinterpretation will be taken later. The report will serve, however, as a maximal point of reference for where Japan’s security policy and SDF activities might go in the near future.
For now, it seems Abe will use the report to assert that Japan cannot defend itself adequately or contribute to stabilizing the regional security environment without making certain changes to its security policy and current interpretations of Article 9. He will argue that such changes will be essential for Japan to continue to enjoy a stable regional environment, as this will help strengthen the US-Japan alliance and allow Japan to play a greater role in regional deterrence.
While indicating his support for many of the positions taken by the kondankai, the language used by Abe in the press conference after the report was released suggested that the changes proposed by the Panel were not a foregone conclusion. This was likely out of consideration for coalition partner Komeito. Abe also attempted to head off wide-ranging concerns among the public and many political elites about how far the changes would go by ruling out the proposal of the kondankai to allow unlimited Japanese participation in United Nations Security Council-sanctioned collective security actions undertaken by multinational forces seeking to restore international order. Abe also suggested that he would only pursue legislation to enable a partial or limited exercise of Japan’s collective self-defense rights. This is opposed to a reinterpretation that would allow the full embrace of the right to exercise collective self-defense, which could allow Japan to use collective self-defense rationales to justify military interventions such as those that took place in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
Even as he tries to present his reinterpretation plans in a moderate light, there are a few different “veto” points Abe will have to negotiate, however – both political and institutional – before this becomes full government policy.
Politically, Abe is to the right even for this rather right-leaning LDP. There are factions and groups within the LDP, including many in the House of Councillors, that are skeptical of the change, either on procedural and legal grounds (ie can political leaders really just “reinterpret” the constitution without Cabinet Legislative Bureau and/or Supreme Court direction?), or in terms of worries about public opinion and electoral backlash. Many less hawkish LDP members are closer to the Japanese public’s attitude in that they support the expansion of activities that the SDF can undertake, particularly in regards to regional security, but are reluctant for the SDF to be proactively engaged in combat overseas, particularly within another country’s sovereign territory.
This is very similar to attitudes within the New Komeito. In addition to a strong reluctance to see the SDF engage in overseas combat, the added complication with Komeito is that the party has symbolically been opposed to CSD since the party’s inception some 50 years ago. The Komeito’s core political support group, Souka Gakkai, is in particular against the change to this core identity for the party, and the organization has already made an official statement asserting that constitutional revision is required rather than reinterpretation. New Komeito MPs themselves are more pragmatic in the sense that they generally support the US-Japan alliance, and are not necessarily against all of the changes that Abe and the kondankai will propose. But the party really does not want to call whatever these changes will be “collective self-defense,” especially if it means they will run afoul of Souka Gakkai. Abe and his supporters, on the other hand, are highly invested in the historical and strategic symbolism around “collective self-defense,” so a lot of the tension between Abe and the Komeito will be focused as much on the language used in any collective cabinet decision, rather than simply being about what the SDF should be able to do.
Within this political context, two institutional checkpoints are important.
First, Abe is trying to rally Cabinet to sign-off as a whole on a new interpretation. This is harder than it might seem as every member of the cabinet needs to sign-off. Former Komeito leader Ota Akihiro is currently Minister of Transport in the Abe Cabinet. If Ota refuses to put his name to any Cabinet decision and Diet bills, Abe cannot proceed and would be basically forced to expel Ota (this would be similar to what happened between the DPJ and Fukushima Mizuho from the SDP over the Futenma relocation plan). That would obviously have significant implications for the coalition relationship which Abe currently relies upon for a majority in the House of Councillors. While they would be unlikely to oppose Abe directly, senior and influential cabinet ministers such as former LDP leader and Minister of Justice Tanigaki Sadakazu, and Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio, head of the less hawkish Kouchikai (宏池会) faction, are skeptical of Abe’s collective security agenda and may wield some influence inside cabinet.
Also, as much as he might want to, Abe can’t just turf out Komeito in favour of pro-CSD opposition parties with sufficient parliamentary strength to give the LDP a House of Councillors majority, even though this is a mathematical possibility. This is because Komeito essentially gives over their votes to the LDP at election time in Japan’s sometimes very close winner-take-all single member electoral districts, especially in urban areas. This is usually in exchange for the LDP not running LDP members in other seats, thereby allowing the Komeito to increase their seat total over and above what they would otherwise get through proportional representation. This relationship is essential for the maintenance of LDP rule, and LDP elders will be very reluctant to allow Abe to single out other parties in the opposition to replace the Komeito in order to  simply have the words “collective self-defense” emblazoned on the new policy. As it is, with the self-destruction of both Watanabe Yoshimi (Your Party) and Hashimoto Toru (Japan Restoration Party), the LDP now has no long-term prospects for collaboration, and in any respect, neither party can deliver votes in the disciplined and consistent way that the Komeito can. Komeito, itself, of course, will be very reluctant to break up the coalition for the same opportunistic reasons, and Komeito’s leader Yamaguchi Natsuo has already said that he has no intention of doing so. Abe and the LDP, however, would like a collective cabinet decision in the books before the end of the year as the US-Japan Revised Guidelines will be revised again.
Second, even if Abe manages to convince Komeito and Minister of Transport Ota to to sign off on collective self-defense and other proposals put forward by the kondankai, Abe still has to go to through parliament and attempt to make changes to anywhere between 10 and 18 laws, including the SDF Law, the UNPKO Law, the “Areas Around Japan” Law, and the Armed Attack Response Law. The two parties will undoubtedly have to make it through some pretty tough questions from the opposition. The opposition will also likely call in experts beyond those who sat on the Panel, and perhaps even former Cabinet Legislative Bureau officials, to contest the kondankai’s arguments. This might hold the legislative process up, especially if already skeptical public sentiment hardens against the proposed changes (with the electoral consequences that might have down the track). It isn’t impossible that some inside the LDP and Komeito get cold feet at some point, especially if the economy starts to stall, or the TPP or some other policy issue rises to trouble the current administration.
 In terms of the whole process of legislation surrounding the Panel’s recommendations, it could take up to 1 to 2 years more. The 1999 “Areas Around Japan” legislation took about two years to negotiate into legislation after the revised guidelines. Ishiba recently told a Washington audience something very similar could happen in this case. From Abe’s point of view, the longer he leaves things up for debate, though, the more politically tense things will become. This is because any controversy and delay will push the changes closer to elections, potentially leading to added caution within the ruling parties. This year is the sweet spot in the electoral cycle in terms of Abe probably not being penalized too much for unpopular policies. Currently, Abe is still in a politically strong position, and has arguably recovered a bit of lost ground since the Designated Secrets Bill and Yasukuni visit at the end of last year. His popularity does not seem to have been greatly harmed by the consumption tax increase last month, and he may be willing to spend political capital on this issue.
Komeito, on the other hand, wants to delay things as long as possible, as that will enhance its ability to extract concessions and compromises from the Abe government, and, they hope, help them avoid compromising on the more controversial elements related to the exercise of collective self-defense. In 2015, we have unified local elections in the spring, and then the LDP presidential elections later in the year. Then in 2016 we have both Lower and Upper House elections, unless current rumours prove true.
The controversy will be kept under wraps for a while longer yet, however. A meeting between the top executives of both the LDP and Komeito will take place on the 20th to discuss how to proceed on “gray zone” issues, relaxing some restrictions on SDF participation and the use of weapons to protect other countries’ militaries and citizens in UNPKOs and other joint operations, and perhaps legislation allowing the SDF to undertake operations to remove Japanese citizens from dangerous areas, as raised by the kondankai.  Discussions behind the scenes on the most controversial live issue of collective self-defense will also be started. What the Panel has to say about the exercise of collective self-defense, and its relation to the debate over its implementation, will be covered here as it becomes more salient over the next few months. For now, below is a brief discussion of the two broader issues of gray zone contingencies and the use of weapons in non-international conflict situations that the LDP and Komeito have already agreed to prioritize in order to essentially keep the political peace for the time being.
Gray Zone Contingencies 
Up until now the SDF has been highly restricted legally in regards to its ability to apply pressure through the threat of, or the use of weapons, even within Japan’s own territory, unless there is a direct and imminent “armed attack” on Japan underway and there is a government mobilization order (such as Defense Mobilization, Maritime Security Operations, or Public Security Operations Orders). There are no provisions that allow the SDF to immediately react to situations which may sit within the “gray zone” between peace and an “armed attack,” currently defined as an “organised and planned use of force against Japan.” The panel in particular has identified illegal and non-innocent submarine incursions into Japan’s territory, attacks on nuclear power facilities, as well as surreptitious paramilitary or guerrilla “invasion” of the remote islands (ie the Senkakus) for the purposes of exerting control over the islands, as three particular issues of concern. The argument is that such aggressive infringements, which could have implications for the security of Japan in addition to being infringements of domestic law, or could represent preludes to an organised armed attack, could best be handled through SDF deployment, rather than relying on the Japan Coast Guard and police through “law enforcement powers,” as has been the legal requirement up until now.
The political debate over better addressing such gray zone contingencies is generally uncontroversial. It was first mentioned in the 2010 NDPG released by the DPJ government as requiring addressing, and both the LDP and the Komeito appear to support adjustments to legislation.

The use of weapons in situations not considered the use of force

The kondankai identified two general situations, not considered to be the use of force in international law, within which the government has said it will consider relaxing restrictions on the use of weapons.

  1. 駆けつけ警護 (kaketsukekeigo), removing obstructions to missions, protecting civilians

Currently the SDF is generally only allowed to use weapons in UNPKO missions to protect themselves and foreign civilian and military personnel under their direct supervision. 駆けつけ警護 (kaketsukekeigo) missions, however, are emergency aid and protection operations that may involve the use of weapons to come to the aid of geographically distant unit under attack or personnel participating in the same UNPKO. Such personnel could include members of foreign militaries, members of NGOs or IOs or other cooperating civilians. The current constitutional interpretation regards such operations to possibly constitute a form of prohibited use of force overseas if the concerned personnel are being held or attacked by a quasi-national or state organization.

The Panel, however, argues that no other nation interprets the “use of weapons” within the context of the international standards set down for UNPKOs (which are generally post-conflict in nature) as being equivalent to the use of force, irrespective of whether the hostile party is a disorganized criminal group, a guerilla force, or a quasi-state organization. Furthermore, the panel argues that as UNPKOs are supposed to be carried out with impartiality, with the consent of the main parties to any conflict, and subsequent to a de facto ceasefire, any legal use of weapons within such missions to protect other civilian and military members of a UNPKO, or civilians in general in a sudden breakdown of peace, should not be considered the constitutionally prohibited “use of force to settle an international dispute.”

Based on similar logic, the panel also suggests that the SDF be allowed to, based on the rules of engagements and standards set down for UNPKOs, remove obstructions to UNPKO missions, and also to allow protection of civilians and the maintenance of security within the context of UNPKOs taking place in fragile states.

In addition to cooperation on gray zone contingencies, the Komeito appears in the last few days to have agreed to allow some relaxation of the use of weapons within UNPKOs might be justified since they believe public opinion is accepting of the use of weapons in such limited cases.

2. Protection and Rescue of Japanese Nationals Abroad

Citing the 2013 Algerian terrorist incident, the kondankai has also suggested the need to allow, within the limits prescribed by international law, for the SDF to come to the rescue and protect Japanese nationals abroad and, if necessary, use weapons to accomplish their missions beyond simple self-preservation. Until this incident the Japanese government had limited ability to dispatch the SDF to allow the protection of Japanese citizens abroad. The kondankai suggests that this is not sufficient and the SDF should be given greater powers. The panel argues that under international law the protection and rescue of nationals abroad is permitted if consent is given by the territorial state, therefore making them “efforts to supplement or substitute security activities of the territorial state.” They also argue that international norms, and previous statements by the Japanese government on these norms, allow the dispatch of military personnel to protect their nationals when another state does not have the will or capacity to protect them against severe attacks on foreign nationals, and could be considered the exercise of self-defense as the responsibility of the state.

The LDP and Komeito coalition will make these issues the top priority for collaboration in the new Diet session in the second half of 2014. It will be subsequent to this, likely in the autumn, that the debate over collective self-defense will heat up between the LDP and Komeito, although deliberations will start in the House of Councillors this month, as is the House of Councillors wont.