Not too early to start thinking about the 2016 election?

Overall, I generally agree with MTC and Tobias Harris that while this election looks like a thumping victory, it may not necessarily enhance Abe’s ability to implement the third arrow of Abenomics and national security and constitutional changes. It will, however, have a positive short-term impact upon Abe’s ability to continue to implement the first two arrows of Abenomics relating to fiscal spending and changing the basis of taxation (particularly the corporate tax), and the continuation of BOJ-led monetary easing.

I perhaps differ a little with MTC in that I would say that the gamble has paid off, although only just. If nothing else, Abe has two more years, which if he uses it wisely and patiently (a big assumption in itself) in terms of issue selection, could result in eventual success.

He is also less likely to face a challenger in September election. A poor result in the election would have made that almost inevitable, and he has avoided this humiliation.

Now, an even more disastrous downturn in the economy or demonstration of administrative incompetence is probably required in order for a genuine challenger to emerge. Prior to Abe calling the election, the simple eating away of Abe’s support rate ahead of the 2015 LDP presidency election (as was already taking place), and the prospect of a 2016 HoR-HoC double election, would have been enough to stimulate significant concern within the LDP and a challenger. Now the House of Representatives members of the LDP will be somewhat calmed. But nine months is still a longtime, and Ishiba Shigeru waits in the wings should something unexpected take place.

I do feel, given expectations around an even more dominating victory, that Abe may have lost a little bit of momentum, nonetheless. While much has been made of the low turnout rate, it is also important to note, as MTC does, that the LDP’s PR percentage was merely a third of all votes. Expectations were that the LDP would get around 40 percent of the vote in PR at the very least. Also important to note is that the LDP’s victories in the single-member districts (SMDs) were even more dependent on the Komeito than was previously the case, which will give LDP leaders pause.

Indeed, the real winners of the election were:

Komeito

While Komeito increased the number of seats by four, compared to a LDP three-seat loss, more important was the effective elimination of two alternative parties (Your Party and the Next Generation Party) that Abe would most likely use in any intra-coalition power play to chasten a recalcitrant Komeito on security issues in particular. Furthermore, MTC estimates in the context of low voter turnout that the LDP may have been reliant on Komeito for up to 25 percent of its SMDs’ votes. If low voter turnout is going to be the new norm in Japan, then attempts to bludgeon Komeito into submission through threats of coalition dissolution will have even less credibility.

The Japan Innovation Party

In its former incarnation, the JRP was also a party that Abe could use in the manner articulated above. However, with the separation from Ishihara and merger with Eda Kenji’s Your Party offshoot, the party has embraced a more moderate, reform orientated and urban-focused party image and policy platform not so dissimilar to the original DPJ. While Hashimoto still sees areas of cooperation with Abe, incentives point in the opposite direction (as discussed below). In any respect, Hashimoto declining to run in this election enhances Eda Kenji’s leadership of the party in the Diet. With the arch-conservative Party for Future Generations being essentially obliterated, and the more moderate JIP holding its own in the PR segment of the vote, then this election may well have consolidated JIP’s electoral relevance and pointed the way to a sustainable strategy for political positioning. And as one of Abe’s ulterior motives for the election was the effective elimination of the electoral relevance of other non-left parties, then victory can be declared in the JIP only losing one seat overall.

The Japan Communist Party

The JCP came close to tripling its representation. While it may be tempting to portray the JCP as really being a principled social democratic party with an unusual relic of a name, until we see any sort of engagement with policymaking, and cooperation and compromise (god-forbid) with other non-LDP parties, then I am reluctant to ascribe much relevance to this development. But 13 more communists will collect a solid salary than prior to the election. That said, the JCP will now be able to submit non-budgetary bills to the Diet, so maybe they will prove me wrong. In any respect, a win for the communists (a phrase one does not hear often these days).

The 6人衆

(rokunin-shu – formerly known as the nana-bugyou 七奉行)

The leaders of the so-called “mainstream” of the DPJ not only see Kaieda Banri fail for the second time, leaving the way open for one of their ilk to take over the DPJ leadership, but also lose his seat. This in theory makes realignment much more manageable as members of this grouping (Okada Katsuya, Maehara Seiji, Azumi Jun, Edano Yukio, Gemba Koichiro, Noda Yoshihiko), along with Hosono Goshi, have increasingly been putting out feelers to the JIP after Ishihara and Hashimoto split the JRP.

Implications for realignment

As noted by CFR’s Shelia Smith, this election was a lesson in why it is important for the opposition to present itself as a genuine alternative with its own ideas. This rings especially true when we consider how little success the DPJ and JIP had in Tokyo’s SMDs despite some degree of cooperation and favourable electoral dynamics. Nevertheless, it would surprise me if DPJ-JIP realignment or a merger took place soon, although a Hosono Goshi or Maehara Seiji victory in the January 2015 DPJ elections might change the dynamics somewhat. Currently, I would say Edano and Hosono have the inside running, but the current leadership vacuum in the DPJ could result in almost anything happening.

While the JIP has moved more closely to the mainstream of the DPJ than many have perhaps realised, there is still a key sticking point around labour legislation and labour unions. The fact that the JIP did better than many expected on the PR ticket suggests that the more moderate strategy has the potential to work, and also means that it will likely not be absorbed into the DPJ as a rump party. Hashimoto was disappointed by the election result, but his political relevance has not been obliterated by the election as many expected. In fact, with the 2016 House of Councillors election, there is an even greater chance that the JIP can establish itself as a genuine political force. Not only can it represent itself as the non-Rengo beholden alternative to the LDP and eat into the LDP’s base, especially if third arrow reforms stagnate ahead of 2016, but the JIP has a great chance to radically eat into the DPJ’s House of Councillors seat tally. In 2016, 41 out of the current 58 DPJ House of Councillors candidates will be up for election. Remember, the DPJ lost 27 out of the 44 seats it had up for election in the first post-DPJ government election in 2013, with many going to the JRP, Your Party, and some going back to the LDP. Furthermore, the electoral system for the House of Councillors (as it currently stands) provides less incentive for a formal amalgamation or even cooperation between the two parties in urban areas compared to a House of Representatives election with many SMDs. In 2013, 42 out of the 73 non-PR seats up for grabs were in more urban or suburban multi-member districts, with a further 48 seats distributed on the basis of proportional representation.

If such realignment is going to take place, current logic would suggest the JIP would do well to hold out until after the 2016 election and see where things stand after the dust settles. It may even be able to negotiate realignment from a position of strength without as much consideration of the still electorally influential Rengo. Either way, while one election outcome is that Abe (potentially) has four more years of rule, the opposition has fewer players and four more years to sort itself out.

Pinning Down the LDP

What does the DPJ, and/or the opposition in general, need to do before the House of Councillors elections in the second half of the year to either have a chance of preventing the LDP gaining a majority in both houses, or, at least make it difficult for the LDP post-election to do as it wishes, potentially to the detriment of the nation?

Abe is off to a good start in terms of managing the narrative about his second stint in the PM’s chair, without having really done all that much, domestically at least. At least for now it appears that he has reversed the recent (or is it?) trend of prime ministers careening downhill in support ratings from day one (with only minor recoveries) in charge, although that may be a function of very low expectations, pessimism, and psycho-political exhaustion on the part of the Japanese citizenry. From the DPJ’s point of view, despite being punished and chastened, it is doing even worse in public opinion polls, which will likely lead to another thrashing in the July House of Councillors elections. The DPJ will have to be rather careful about the particular fights it picks, and arguably will need to cooperate on certain policy and legislative programs to gain any visibility. Being seen to be obstructive while Abe is on the upswing is, after the last two experiences of both obstructionist DPJ and LDP oppositions is going to test the public’s patience. At the very least, from the public’s point of view, the DPJ could assist in implementing policy in opposition, something which it failed to do, for reasons for which it is equally culpable, while in government.

However, the DPJ and others will be very aware that the LDP will try and only deal with the easy and/or the “popular” policy issues, or issues that make it look like it is being constructive (in contrast to the Tanigaki era), while trying to keep internal peace within the party and within the LDP-Komeito coalition until at least after 2013 HoC elections, something that the DPJ failed to do in the lead up to the 2010 HoC elections in terms of its issue selection and party management. The opposition will need to complicate this picture as much as possible, even if to save the country from a potentially rather extreme agenda.

The Abe administration has been evasive on a number of issues. Abe himself has only been prominent in foreign policy and has tightly controlled information and is managing access to  his person so as to avoid as much controversy as possible. So far his cabinet appears to have been reasonably disciplined in terms of (not making) gaffes. While Abe and his conservative proxies have sent out a number of signals regarding the more nationalist aspects of the agenda, Abe and top government officials have been saying very little about what Abe may or may not exactly do in regards to issues like changing the constitution and/or revising the constitutional ban on collective-self defense, and relooking at some of the issues and statement regarding Japan’s wartime behaviour.

The goal for the DPJ in particular will thus be to pin the Abe administration down on a variety of issues and ensure that it actually has to at least make clear statements about what it is going to do post–HoC election in terms of:

1) The TPP.

The administration has indicated that they will put off a decision until after the HoC election. It may be that the LDP is expecting that there will be realization that the TPP is too optimistic and that, after all, some “exceptions” will become allowable. There is a general sense that  2013 will probably be the last year where the different sides attempt to negotiate the most aspirational/ideal form of the TPP. Even alliance managers in DC have noted that it is unlikely the US itself will strike a free trade deal with no exceptions. Japan and the LDP will likely be ready to join if this realization does indeed come about. From the opposition’s point of view, however, letting the LDP have its own way in this regard is far too easy, especially given how much agony the DPJ suffered even just talking about maybe, possibly, joining the talks.* Pro- and anti-TPP forces will attempt to push Abe on this issue closer to the House of Councillors elections, even if just to stir dissent within the LDP itself.

2) House of Representatives Electoral Reform.

Abe made a promise to Noda when Noda called the election late last year that more thorough electoral reform would be considered in the next Diet session. Much like with Noda’s promise to hold an election “soon” around negotiations with the LDP and Komeito on consumption tax, the opposition will need to make this an issue of honesty and probity of the new government. If Abe takes up this promise AFTER the House of Councillors election, and after a majority has been secured in both houses, then it hardly needs to be said that the outcome is going to be very bleak for opposition government for some time in Japan.

3) The Murayama and Kono Statements, and the Yasukuni Shrine visit.

This is a really important issue that the DPJ in particular just cannot let the administration get away from in terms of committing decisively one way or another. Arguably this is not just to complicate things within the LDP itself, and to make the issue difficult for the Abe administration by putting some much needed daylight between the general public and the noisy revisionist base, but should be addressed as an issue of vital national importance. Japan’s competition for various nations’ affections, both in and outside Asia is going remarkably well while China is starting to make people, even former moderates and sympathizers in the region and beyond, more uncomfortable. A replacement in any way of either of the two statements, the Murayama one in particular, will eliminate almost all gains almost instantly. My personal theory is that the current talk about the various statements represents a form of “dog whistle” politics purposefully undertaken while the public is distracted during new years and by talk over “Abenomics” and the economy, that will not end up coming to anything substantial. This, other things being equal, should be mainly because Abe surely (?!) knows how bad such acts would be for Japan’s relationships with the very countries that are critical to its national interests, including his own foreign policy agenda. It may be that, irrespective of how much Abe himself would like to give this group what it wants, he will string the revisionist base a long for the meantime and give them hope – after all, who else but Abe and this particular cabinet would help them realize their dreams of “restoring Japanese pride” or whatever it is that they believe is so vital.  The issue for Abe is that the public will likely give Abe some leeway to address other issues for a period of time, but this will not last. And it would be unforgivable for the opposition to let the issue of absolute commitment (or otherwise) to the two statements slide before the July election, especially if I am wrong in terms of my personal theory. As for making an issue of a potential Abe visit to Yasukuni Jinja after the July election, this may have to depend on future events. It is likely that the direct fallout either way in the current environment domestically will be negligible, unless Abe jeopardizes an improvement in relations with China by visiting the shrine. If relations are still tense, and Chinese boats in and around the Senkakus come August, then the public may be rather unaccommodating in terms of concerning themselves with Chinese criticism on this issue. The implications for foreign policy management will be somewhat more challenging, of course, and may indirectly hurt Abe both at home and abroad, although not as bad as revision of the Murayama and Kono statements would be.

4) Constitutional Change, Security Policy, and Emergency Response.

This is a potentially complicated one for the opposition. There are first of all, actually areas of overlap in terms of what the various political groups would like to see in terms of changes to Japan’s security policy – as the Algerian disaster unfolds with a very likely high number of Japanese fatalities, this may further push the various groups together. This is one area where striking an inherently antagonistic pose to the LDP and Abe’s agenda may backfire, especially if he builds political capital through a successful, even if short-term, economic recovery and/or the implementation of a coherent (even if mistaken) economic plan and growth strategy. In order to moderate perhaps some of the more unwise elements of the agenda, the opposition may have to commit to working with the government in a proactive way and attempt to build a consensus around security policy and a timetable for constitutional revision, by embracing a process that appeals to the public in terms of it being sufficiently deliberative and not rushed, and moderate (AKA legitimate, cf. “constitutional reinterpretation”). It may be wise for the DPJ to get out ahead of the LDP and the public, which has, and may even more so, become more hawkish (but not necessarily “militaristic”) in 2013 regarding regional security. This is of course notwithstanding an unlikely turnaround in the Chinese approach to East Asia in general, and the policy of challenging Japan’s effective control over the Senkaku Islands in particular. I suspect here the key is to restrain, not to obstruct. While the Diet already has its own process for looking at the constitution and revision, it appears that it is treading water. Perhaps the DPJ should take the initiative prior to the election but with sufficient time for the LDP to commit or reject, and propose a multi-partisan commission of some sort that will also solicit the views of the public and other stakeholders. The Komeito (who really actually doesn’t want the LDP to do too well in July, but can’t really say so out loud) may be sufficiently concerned with its LDP coalition partner and could be open to backing such a proposal. If Ishihara can be sidelined even further in favour of Hashimoto et al, then the JRP may also be amenable to such a proposal as it would likely give them more visibility and not let the LDP have its way in terms of making the running around security issues within that proportion of the public interested in a stronger security policy.

One of the advantages of Noda’s “early” call for the election is that 7 months is sufficient time to allow the public to get to know the Abe administration, 2.0. If the public is still not one hundred percent sure of what Abe might do on some very important and consequential issues come July, they may be very reluctant to turn over both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors to the administration for potentially up to three years without a clear policy program. It is only fair to the public for the opposition to at some point start asking the right questions and to be relentless in doing so, but by also being constructive at the same time.

* One remembers that when Maehara Seiji, early on in the TPP talks during the DPJ era, came out and suggested that ultimately if the TPP was going to work against Japan’s national interests that Japan could, and should, withdraw from negotiations. Maehara was of course, 100 percent correct, even if saying so was very unwise. And indeed it was unwise – the DPJ and Maehara was assailed for being “naive” and “inappropriate” and all other manner of things. Perhaps fairly so. Nevertheless, fast forward two to three years and a top level LDP official said pretty much the same thing – to thunderous silence and a deafening lack of concern within the media.

Pendulum Districts 2012

From Asahi Shimbun

According to the Asahi Shimbun (日), 145 SMDs went for the LDP/Komeito in 2005, DPJ in 2009, and then again for the LDP/Komeito in 2012 (what the Asahi terms the “pendulum phenomenon”). 71 one of them were in the urban metropolis of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba and Saitama area. This is a very interesting bit of information that could prove useful for the next lower house general election if it is held under a similar system to the current one. If the LDP-Komeito relationship survives the Abe tenure, however long that may be, then in the next election there will be significant incentives for the JRP, a new centrist DPJ, and perhaps the YP to form alliances in these districts, particularly if the LDP disappoints in some way.

Is it Time to Start Thinking about 2013?

As was predicted here around the time of the dissolution of the Diet the mechanics of the current Japanese political system makes it likely that the LDP-Komeito coalition, if not the LDP on its own, will get a majority on December 16th. At the official start of the election season on December 4th most of the mainstream media outlets have started to predict this very outcome This is despite the LDP’s support rate under Abe being less than stellar, and there being almost no enthusiasm for the party. This seems to have been a (what should have been obvious) stimulus to the likes of the JRP who will now look to turn their undivided attention to attacking the LDP. JRP 2IC Osaka Governor Matsui has even come out groveling to Your Party’s Watanabe Yoshimi, saying (日) that he and Hashimoto were in hindsight “too cheeky” and insufficiently respectful of “Watanabe-Sempai’s (political) life experience.” With the LDP the default option, uninspiring to many as it is, nothing short of some grand gesture/announcement by the two “third pole” parties is going to change the the narrative and outcome of this particular election. It is possible that they may turn around what looks to be a fait accompli, just unlikely at this point in time. This is because it is unfortunately too late to offload Ishihara and the other retro-conservatives of the Taiyo no Tou, and make a play for Your Party amalgamation. With the LDP lurking at around 20-25 percent in the PR vote, it does not have to do much better in the SMDs, if at all, than it did in the last disastrous election for the LDP, to acquire a majority this time around, given the rest of the vote will be split in the SMDs between the JRP/YP, the DPJ, and the Japan Future Party (JFP). This will look like a comprehensive victory, but the deeper numbers, as we will all know, will suggest anything but a mandate.

Which raises some interesting questions about the Japanese political system going forward. There has been discussion about the current configuration, of the “conservative” LDP, the “whatever-you-personally-want-to-label-them” JRP, the centrist DPJ, and the “liberal” JFP, being representative of the true realignment of Japanese politics, as opposed to a seemingly “forced” two party British/Westminster system. I had this discussion with good friend Bryce Wakefield recently; and friend of Sigma1, Michael Penn at Shingetsu News Agency, has recently put forward the same hypothesis in last week’s subscription-only “Tokyo Diplomat.” [So credit goes to them].

Given the complexity of the Japanese political system and the difficulty in identifying what we Westerners tend to perceive as “left” and “right” in the Japanese ideological spectrum, then this seems a pretty solid hypothesis. We may have to give up on a two-party system – and that might be ok. As long as the parties themselves are somewhat internally coherent (not quite there yet of course) then having more than two (incoherent) parties may not be a bad thing.

If this is the case, then Japan clearly has the wrong political system. If as is predicted the LDP does go on to win quite convincingly on the back of 20 percent support in the Proportional Representation system (ie their “true” support level) then something is quite clearly wrong. First-Past-the-Post systems limit political representation for the benefit of simplifying the political system and promoting stable, but still democratic, governance. However, this is more for systems where two major political parties fiercely compete but are likely to fall a bit short of getting 50 percent of the vote from time to time on their own. However, not this short. 20 and even 30 percent “true” support translating into perhaps 60 percent of the number of seats seems absurd. It clearly undermines too much the “popular democracy” component of the democracy-governance trade-off of FPP systems (notwithstanding the PR component of the current Japanese system). Throw in the fact that rural votes are worth two times as much as urban votes (not to mention this being unconstitutional), then it becomes an absolute farce.

This is not to say that a return to the Multiple Member Districts (MMD) of old is desirable. That would be a step backwards. It does raise questions regarding Noda and Abe’s plan/promise to cut the number of seats during the 2013 regular Diet session, however. When you have four parties which all deserve some kind of voice, why cut the PR seats? Especially when they are the only part of the system that gives certain citizens an “equal value” vote. Cutting the seats to save on waste is noble enough, but doing so in a way that might enshrine permanent but unpopular LDP-Komeito rule in the medium-term will be undesirable, even for the DPJ. The DPJ is unlikely to ever again win the way it did in 2009. It may be able to gain in the 2013 House of Councillors election, but it will not be much. The truth is, the DPJ is not the “2nd party” that they think they are in a Westminster-style system. Neither will the JRP be. When we all come back next year and Abe is forced to consider his promise to undertake reform of the House of Representatives, reducing the PR seats will be exactly the wrong thing to do, unless there is some kind of realignment into two blocs.

At the risk of sounding parochial, there is of course a solution, one that may only have a six month window open for consideration if the LDP is mildly successful at governing.

It produces good, stable cabinet-focused governance based on coalition governments, and pretty good representation across the spectrum while still incentivizing centrist policy-making. It is not that different from the current Japanese system in that it has both FPP elements and PR elements. And if a party is genuinely popular then it doesn’t prevent them from claiming a mandate for reform.

Mixed Member Proportional representation (MMP).* It’s perfect for a natural four (or three) party system with a Westminster heritage. And, citizens are all enfranchised as both their party and their electorate vote are valued the same as anywhere else in the nation. Imagine that.

* With all of the necessary tweaks needed to make it work in Japan.

The JRP-Your Party Truce

Too much ink has been spilt over the issue of whether Your Party and the Japan Restoration Party should merge their forces. And in the process it would seem that the public bickering between the two has hurt their respective chances. There was too much focus on the issue of the merger and whether the two groups’ policies could be harmonized – this was never really an absolute necessity. As it currently stands the two sides now overlap in 28 SMDs, many of them in the crucial swing blocs such as Southern Kanto and Tokyo (where 59 of the total 300 SMDs are located).

It does seem however that both sides have come to an uneasy truce. Watanabe has responded (日) very favourably to the JRP’s proposal to “fade out” (日) nuclear energy by 2030, which while not “Zero Nuclear,” seems less like a backtrack than the initial post-Taiyo no To merger compromise. The two sides have also intimated they will stop attacking each other and also not add to the overlapping SMDs issue and will both support  (日) a single candidate in SMDs where they don’t already overlap. This may be too late however – the SMD overlap has taken place in some crucial areas and it seems that support for third pole forces has hit something of a wall. The last week or so of squabbling has undermined the narrative of momentum that the media originally was fostering. It may also be that Ishihara has consolidated the possible third pole vote, but has also put a ceiling on it given that he is a divisive figure. In the most recent Nikkei poll (日) the JRP was still only at 15 percent behind the LDP at 23 percent. In terms of the district level vote, it is impossible to predict without specific polls, but such numbers don’t suggest that the third pole parties will be able to overhaul LDP candidates who have some natural advantages (including money) in waging electoral war in SMD districts.

Thus, without a dramatic change in the election narrative (or a scandal/controversy of some sort) it still seems likely that the LDP will take out a significant number of the SMDs and an LDP-Komeito coalition will probably achieve a majority come December 16.

Hashimoto’s Deadline to Watanabe?

Hashimoto seems aware of what he needs to be aware of. In between declaring war on the LDP, on TV Asahi Hashimoto once again reached (日) out to Your Party, saying that a decision on uniting the two parties’ forces would need to be made by 29 November when the Tokyo Governor election will be officially announced. Hashimoto went as far as saying that he was not at all concerned with giving up his position as second-in-charge (acting leader) if that is what is required to achieve realignment in the Japanese political world.

Hashimoto even offered up a pragmatic way to resolve the issue of overlapping SMD districts between YP and the JRP:

Janken.

Will Your Party-Japan Restoration Party Discord Swing the Election to the LDP?

The overlapping of Single Member Districts between Your Party and the JRP continues. As of late yesterday the two parties have fielded candidates in 18 of the same SMDs (日), including, somewhat inexplicably, overlap in 5 Kanagawa districts and 7 Tokyo districts. These districts would be ones ripe for the picking of a united third party, as Tokyo and Kanagawa have swung decisively towards the party with a reform mantra in previous years (such as Koizumi in 2005, and DPJ in 2009). The LDP will be most happy as apart the two parties will gain a lower share of the vote than they would united, liking tipping these districts to the LDP unless the public perceives that one of them (likely Your Party’s candidate in this case) is not worth voting for. It would seem the two sides are in a potentially disastrous game of chicken, although not yet close to being beyond salvage.

Interestingly, the perception in Your Party is that the JRP is speaking of collaboration but is really out to overwhelm Your Party nationally and regionally, thus making a “third pole” vote for the JRP a fait accompli by election day.  There is likely truth in this.

However this might be a little self-indulgent on Your Party’s part. The explicit reason why a deal has not been done is because the JRP rejected the “Your Party in the East, JRP in the West” division of labour proposed by YP. The problem is that the YP was always going to be the junior partner and an inability to comprehend that suggests that Watanabe Yoshimi’s ego may well be the biggest, and certainly the most fragile, of the three main third pole protagonists (as noted on this blog many times). The JRP ultimately has wider appeal, due to personnel, but also because, while reform-orientated, the JRP agenda is more pragmatic with distinctly non neo-liberal elements mixed in with the more obviously neo-liberal reform proposals. This fits with the Japanese public who want to see smaller government in certain places (construction, bureaucracy), but are not particularly doctrinaire about the small v large government issue. Furthermore, as Osaka Governor and JRP executive Matsui was right to note (and has again been emphasised on this blog on a few occassions), Watanabe’s political judgement deserves to be questioned given the complete and utter lack of accomplishments over the last three years by Your Party. This is despite being in the position to actually influence proceedings through a crucial number of Diet members in the House of Councillors (at least before the DPJ started shedding numbers). A pragmatic, intelligent leader would have reached across the aisle and perhaps made even one or two deals- for example an acceptable reform by the DPJ in exchange for a YP core reform. That this did not happen and Watanabe essentially whinged for three years, while taking occassionally witty potshots at the DPJ (while being unable to take them in return!), suggests that perhaps indeed Hashimoto and Matsui have the better political judgement in terms of staying aloof from YP. After all, Your Party’s support seems to have dipped over time rather than increased despite the ample number of non-committed/independent voters in Japan that may have been attracted to an independent party (between 50-65 percent depending on the poll). Ultimately, Your Party was unable to distinguish itself from the LDP in any meaningful way despite pretensions to do so (and probably also unable to get over the PR fail that is the Your Party moniker).

In fact, arguably Your Party’s existence, perhaps ironically, is owed to Noda. Only a matter of a month or so ago Your Party had suffered defections and there was internal disharmony around Watanabe’s leadership. It seemed that in the long-term Your Party would continue to bleed all their remaining support to whatever movement Hashimoto was trying to build over time. Without Noda calling a snap election then Hashimoto et al may well have had more time to build a nation-wide political machine without relying on the support of Your Party, or for that matter, Ishihara. Noda’s call essentially revived Your Party and forced Hashimoto to reconsider an alliance with the Watanabe et al.*

Nevertheless, while the JRP may be justified in thinking it has the upper hand, they still need to be smart. As I argued in the previous post, it is not so much about how many seats the JRP can get vis-a-vis the DPJ, and for that matter, Your Party, but what impact third pole parties will have on the likelihood of a LDP-Komeito coalition gaining the majority. With 300 SMD seats up for grabs, and the DPJ unlikely to get much more than 100 of them (at best), then there is still plenty of scope for the LDP, as a default, to gain the 150 or so SMD seats required to gain a majority, even if Abe Shinzo fails to inspire.

Perhaps more important than anything, is the media perception. The media is following closely the Watanabe-Hashimoto collaboration story, and while it has emphasized their cooperation (such as campaigning together and drawing a 1000 person crowd), it will also seize ruthlessly on any appearance of discord. Arguably it already is. Even if there is less than meets the eye in terms of conflict between YP and JRP, the Japanese media, as it is wont to do, will focus on the personal politics,  emphasize the petty aspects, and the conflict. That could will well give the public second thoughts about a vote for a third pole party.

*Noda would have seen that the third parties were vulnerable and calculated that now was the time to strike with dissension in the ranks. Where Noda miscalculated was that Ishihara and Hahsimoto would be pragmatic enough to join forces with each other and compromise on issues such as nuclear power and the TPP.

Key Factor for Determining the Election Outcome

Assumption: The Liberal Democratic Party is likely to get 60 seats in the various local Proportional Representation blocs – It is hard to see them doing worse than they did in 2009, their worst defeat ever, even if they fail to get back a lot of the pre-2009 vote. The Japan Restoration Party (JRP) will instead likely eat away at those who would have swung back from the DPJ to the LDP in this election if the JRP was not contesting the local PR blocs. If there is evidence of the JRP eating into core LDP support then this prediction will change, but I have yet to see this evidence.

However, that Ishihara is running in the Tokyo PR bloc, and Higashikokubaru (probably) in the Kyushu bloc, is smart and enhances the ability of the JRP to do this by freeing these two prominent individuals to campaign across these broad districts without engaging in a Single Member District (SMD) race. The main areas to prioritize for the JRP in terms of going for the PR vote would be Hokkaido, Tokyo, Southern Kanto, Kinki (of course) and Kyushu. Right now the opinion polls are all over the place regarding how much support the post-merger JRP actually has, so I will refrain from a prediction on the JRP’s likely PR seat haul for now.

New Komeito is however likely to improve on its 21 seats from 2009 as it regains some PR vote back from the DPJ from those who would  not vote for the conservative LDP or populist JRP. It is also likely, in deals with these two parties, to pick back up a few SMD seats from the DPJ in Kinki and Tokyo. With 30 or so Komeito seats and the LDP’s likely 60 PR seats, the key to the LDP-Komeito getting a majority (241) would be the LDP getting 150 of the 300 SMD seats. If this was a straight LDP-DPJ election then this would be very likely, and in fact the LDP gaining 170-180 seats or more, and perhaps even getting a simple majority on its own without the Komeito, would be plausible.

Thus the JRP’s entry into the election, and particularly the alignment with other “third pole” parties, is critical for changing this dynamic. First, Ishihara, Hashimoto and Noda are all arguably better campaigners than the sometimes prevaricating (and often too talkative, as noted by Jun Okumura) Abe. Abe has already seemingly backtracked on his BOJ statements as well as his TPP statements. This may have an overall effect in terms of bringing the LDP brand down by complicating the narratives around who is responsible for whatever it is someone needs to be responsible for in modern Japan. If Abe could focus just on Noda and the DPJ then these prevarications might no be so much of an issue given the DPJ’s own track record, but with the media focusing on the enigmatic third pole candidates the construction of a coherent and winning narrative is going to be more difficult. Also, with this prominent JRP presence, and potential threat,  Abe and the LDP will be forced to attack, rather than ignore this grouping and focus on the DPJ, as they would have otherwise done.

However more important than this is the strategy towards the SMDs the JRP in particular is going to adopt. An important part of making strategy for the JRP in this case is balancing short and long-term objectives. It would seem obvious that the objective for the JRP is to gain as many seats as possible. However, arguably preventing the LDP (and Komeito) from regaining a majority should be given even greater priority, although the two objectives are not mutually exclusive.

What I mean by this is that, in terms of how to focus its resources, the JRP should concentrate on the SMDs where its presence can turn the race into a genuine three way contest. In other words, those electorates where the LDP won in 2005, lost in 2009 to the DPJ, and would be likely to swing back to the LDP in 2012 without a third option. There is likely to be around 120 or so of these type of seats. They will not win all of these or even most, and they may even throw a few to the DPJ, but if they manage to deprive the LDP of the magic 150 SMD seats, then that would be the price to pay for relevance and influence in 2013. In this sense, getting 30 seats is as good as 100 if the LDP will be forced to rely on another party. If they compete in what would otherwise be safe DPJ districts in a two-horse race, and only succeed in turning over the SMD to the LDP, they will be further from what should be their objective. Of course, in their campaign rhetoric the DPJ will probably be the easy target, but ultimately it is the LDP that is the true “enemy” for the JRP and others in terms of electoral strategy.

The JRP also needs to vigorously court LDP votes in the SMDs and not just focus on picking up some of the “easy” votes leaving the DPJ. To do this however the JRP will need to work with Watanabe Yoshimi’s Your Party by not overlapping in SMD districts, even if they compete for regional PR votes. Voters will need to be convinced that a vote for a third party will not be a wasted vote.

There are some signs that the JRP and YP are coordinating in this fashion. On the 19th November Your Party and the JRP endorsed their first mutual candidate (日), Your Party’s Ishii Ryouma, a candidate interestingly enough running in Osaka #12 inside the JRP’s home base. Originally Ishii was going to run in Osaka #2 but was moved out of consideration for the JRP candidate. The JRP also went back on their initial plan to run a candidate in every PR bloc’s symbolically important number one district, out of consideration for YP who announced (日) they would run candidates in 10 out of the 11 #1 SMDs. However the next day it became clear that the two were also overlapping. When YP announced their initial tranche of candidates they named a candidate to run in Hokkaido #2 where the JRP is also running a candidate. Your Party did however postpone a decision on Tokyo #23 where the JRP is also running a candidate, but followed it up a few days later by announcing a new face to run in Tokyo #23. Tokyo #4 also seems to overlap. In the YP and JRP’s respective announcements of their third trance of candidates, the Kanagawa area, an area where the LDP is likely to do well compared to 2009, is notable in that both sides have committed candidates to the same five SMD districts. One has to question the wisdom of this.

Anyhow, I will be keeping an eye on this particular facet (coordination between the YP and the JRP) as events unfold over the next few weeks, and hopefully some consistent opinion polls with a regional breakdown will appear allowing more informed decisions. After the election season officially starts on December 4, I will also highlight some key SMD races and whether the YP/JRP is likely to to deprive the LDP of 150 SMD seats.

What Can Ishihara and Hashimoto do Together?

Two of the biggest egos in Japanese politics have found some room for compromise  (日) after weeks of dancing around the issue of working together. Ishihara Shintaro has recognized that Hashimoto Toru’s Nippon Ishin no Kai has the better political brand positioning and has decided to fold his party into Hashimoto’s for the upcoming election. However, Hashimoto has allowed Ishihara to take the lead (for now) and relegated himself to second position in the new collaboration’s set up. They have also managed to put behind them a few policy major differences and have announced a somewhat clear (relatively speaking) memorandum of agreement on what the party would actually initially focus on if it was in the position to affect the passage of legislation/policy-making in the next Diet.

What is notable is a failure to mention constitutional change. This is probably smart, as while no one will be confused regarding either man’s general orientation towards foreign affairs, issues of constitutional change, education and nationalism, and security policy, are things that the Japanese public has consistently indicated in polls are secondary to fixing the domestic political system, the economy, and other pressing social issues. The order of addressing these issues is important to the public, and it would seem that Abe and the conservative wing of the LDP are forgetting (日) this already.*

The document the two sides produced is reasonably short – a rough summary follows:

【１】　Breaking down the centralization of power

Establish a new tax collection system with increased local government responsibility for collection and deciding on its use- the consumption tax, to be increased to 11 percent, will dedicate five percent for fixed government financing and six percent for shared local government finances

【２】　Begin discussions around the doushuusei (a psuedo-federal) system for organizing regional governance

【３】　Initiate policies for the creation of an economy focused on successful small, medium and micro-business enterprise.

【４】　For funding the social security system, introduce appropriate insurance premiums, revise payment conditions, and remake the personal and asset taxation system.

【５】　Look towards participating in the TPP but in discussions ensure that the national interest is not harmed. [A well needed corrective, probably forced upon Hashimoto by Ishihara] In addition there is a need to introduce policies to enhance the competitiveness of the agricultural sector.

【６】　Establishment of a new energy distribution system

With regards to nuclear power, there needs to be （１）Construction of [new] rules regarding（a）safety standards（b）a new safety assurance system （c）processing of spent nuclear fuel（d）identification of responsibility; and（２）Liberalization of the energy sector [away from the regional monopoly system]

【７】　Regarding the Senkaku Islands dispute, push for China to go to the International Court of Justice to resolve the issue. If a case is brought against Japan by China, then Japan should respond in kind.

【８】　Ban party and Diet member donations from businesses and associations. Expand system for encouraging individual donations. As a transitional measure, have an upper limit for donations by businesses and associations

Afterword: The above list of objectives is a reasonably pragmatic, and frankly well needed, simplification of the various ideas floating around between the “third pole” parties. Perhaps Hashimoto in particular has realized that there were too many question marks over what he and his group would do with any power given to them by the citizens. It is also a response to recent criticism by both the LDP and DPJ who have suggested that deals made by the various small parties would be nothing more than “unholy alliances” (an ironic criticism to say the least). In any respect, the aggregated support rate for the various third pole parties (including Your Party and Tax Reducation Japan) still sits under ten percent depending on the opinion poll. A failure to improve on that figure, as well as to pool resources and field candidates in various SMD districts around the whole country, will not only curtail Ishihara and Hashimoto’s long-term ambitions by diluting their leverage, but given the electoral math,** would likely result in the LDP and Komeito coalition securing a majority on December 16th, thereby making the song and dance about the need for a “third pole” moot.

* The proposal is to remove the clause in the textbook certification process that requires consideration of the historic relationship with neighbouring countries. In fact they want to overhaul the whole system of textbook certification and design process, with its “masochistic tendencies,” as a way of making children appreciate ‘traditional Japanese culture’ and to regenerate the Japanese education system. Because that is obviously the main and most pressing problem with the Japanese education system…

** A subject for a post perhaps later next week if some useful opinion polls come out.

Reaction to Hashimoto’s Senkaku Suggestion

In response to Hashimoto Toru’s suggestion that Japan take China to the ICJ over the Senkaku Islands dispute, the Japanese government was negative, and it continued to insist there is no territorial dispute despite Hashimoto admonishment over the stance. No surprises so far.

However, two non-cabinet members of the DPJ, and probably the two most important voices on security issues within the party, have shown a hint of flexibility on the issue. Two days ago Nagashima Akihisa, the prime minister’s foreign and security policy aide, said on national television (日) that Japan would consider responding to a Chinese request to seek ICJ arbitration. Then this evening, on the same TBS station, Maehara Seiji, who will likely be back in the cabinet tomorrow, also said  (日) the government would give consideration to any Chinese proposal to go to the ICJ. He did rule out however Japan being the one to make the initial move, saying that as Japan was the nation that actually administrated control over the islands then it would be unusual for Japan to be the one to lodge the dispute with the ICJ. That does make some sense – such a move may project doubt over the legitimacy of one’s own claim. Ultimately the government probably forced its own hand in this regard and it is possible that it may have regreted reacting to ROK President Lee’s provocation on Dokdo by lodging a complaint with the ICJ (which the ROK then rejected), given that a Japanese refusal to respond in kind on the Senkaku Islands would look contradictory. Of course, without an official government statement suggesting that it would consider responding to any ICJ case, then the contradiction will not be fully resolved. Nevertheless, this is more flexibility, and more sense, than many expected.

While I have no basis for assuming this, but it is always possible that the recent willingness of the US to (re)assert that the Senkakus were covered under Article 5 of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was connected by the Obama administration to Japan perhaps showing a degree more flexibility on the issue and at the very least consider ICJ arbitration, thus putting the ball in China’s court. Will the CCP take the, quite significant risk, as detailed in Friday’s post, of taking this to the ICJ? Is this a bluff by the Japanese government? If so, will it be called?

It will be interesting to see if this gets any coverage in the Chinese media, or how, or if, the Chinese government reacts to the overture.