How different are the newly enfranchised Japanese voters?

According (jp) to two concurrently implemented Yomiuri Shimbun surveys, not significantly different. But there are a few ‘highlights.’
Yomiuri May 2016
Comment: 60 percent of 18-19 year old respondents could not bring themselves to select a party they have a favourable opinion of, even when pushed to consider them in comparison!  (NB: SDP and other parties at 0 or 1%). In most questions in this survey, the newly enfranchised seem about as optimistic and as pessimist (read: pessimistic) as the general population on the state of Japan’s politics.
Nuclear Energy
Comment: While clearly public opinion overall still works against the current government’s nuclear energy policy, I do think it is interesting that just over 30% of 18-19 year old respondents wouldn’t mind a return to pre-disaster levels of nuclear energy or higher. Perhaps climate change concerns outweigh nuclear risk for some?
Constitution Amendment
Comment: It seems that the reduction of voting age that some constitutional revisionists hoped would facilitate constitutional change may well backfire. In this survey, 18-19 year old respondents were also less approving of last year’s ‘collective self-defense’ security legislation (63% vs 57% for the over 20 sample).
Favourability towards constitutional revision ‘in general’ is normally well over 50 percent, often in the 60 percent range. The only time this has not been the case since the 1990s has been…when Abe has been in power (both times). Favourability towards Article 9 revision specifically has dropped (jp) from the high 30s/low 40s to the 20 percentage point range! (in some (jp) cases).
This might also be to do with Abe’s incumbency, but I suspect also that with the passage of the security legislation many moderates may not see a strong argument for going further. After all, Abe got (a sort of ) collective self-defense, and nobody strongly believes (jp) that the SDF is unconstitutional anyway.
International Dispute Engagement
Comment: This poll question is interesting because of the wording regarding Japan concerning itself with ‘resolving international disputes’, which echoes the wording of a certain Article 9. Usually these questions are worded in terms of diplomatic engagement or ‘international contribution’ rather than ‘international dispute resolution’ and get a more favourable response. That said, there is not a strong desire for increased isolationism.
Kind of Country
Comment: The Japanese public loves welfare and peace. Taken together, these poll questions would suggest some public caution of the ‘proactive contribution to peace’ narrative in terms of the nation security and values promotion aspects emphasized by the current government.
Comment: I have been paying attention to polls on attitudes to immigration in Japan for some time, and it always strikes me how responses to immigration questions can vary considerably (more than others) depending on wording and choices given. Certainly there is a hardcore faction that is virulently against an immigration policy no matter what, but from time to time there are polls that suggest there might not be quite the antipathy to certain types of immigration emphasized in the media narrative on Japan. In this case, 68% of 18-19 year old respondents, and 51% for the rest of the sample, either decisively or cautiously agree with accepting ‘committed’ foreigners. The number of foreign residents has been steadily increasing anyway, and ‘we’ haven’t wrecked the place yet.
Comment: Japanese are clearly not ‘neo-liberals.’
Both surveys used a stratified two-stage random sampling method, were administered by post at the end of March, and targeted sample sizes of 2000 potential voters. The 18 and 19 year old survey attained a response rate of 55%, while the over 20 survey attained a response rate of 65% by the May 6 cut-off date. 

The Secret Life of a Kiwi PhD Candidate

I will be starting today what I will endeavor to make a monthly feature. Growing out of my PhD, I have been tracking a large amount of polling information over the last few years and further back into the past in regards to Japanese politics and foreign policy. If the data exists, I likely know about it, if not have already worked it into a chart of some sort.

While most of this information and the associated analysis will be kept under wraps for the time being, in an effort to blog at least once a month I will provide a run down of the latest cabinet support rate data from over 11 different survey organizations, and analysis of any other survey questions from the previous month that piqued my interest.

The quality of the analysis will likely be directly correlated with the amount of time I have, but if you have a better take on the data than I do, then please feel free to continue the conversation in the comments.

Very Brief Methodology Note: I am using polls only from organizations that take a nationwide probability sample, preferably using two-stage stratified random sampling methods. These polls generally derive 1000 participants from a population sample, although some organizations such as the Asahi often acquire a sample size of up to 2000. Assuming a minimum sample size of around 900-1000 participants, the confidence interval for these surveys is approximately 2.2 percent at a 95 percent confidence level, and 2.9 percent at a 99 percent confidence level.  Most of these survey organizations’ surveys have participation rates of around 50 percent, which in contemporary surveying is actually quite robust. That said, this does not mean all polls are created equal and I will over time point out those polls which yield results that deviate consistently from the median and average poll results.