Like the Algerian crisis in 2013, this crisis does further highlight Japan’s vulnerability to global terrorism. But in some important ways this case is quite different from the Algerian case. The Japanese public in the past has been much less forgiving of individuals who have sought to place themselves in direct conflict zones, while the Algerian situation will be seen as a direct attack on Japan’s citizens and national interests. Even in reaction to this very brazen attack in Algeria, the Japanese government only went as far as strengthening its ability to use military transportation to evacuate citizens. I’d be inclined to think that if the Algerian attack did not rouse the Japanese public and enable the passing of more substantive security legislation, then this event may not be a game changer.
In practical terms, it is unclear what the Japanese government can do in this situation since it does not have the legal or military capability to undertake special forces or other military operations in the Middle East. Aside from the very unlikely possibility that the US and NATO partners have the necessary intelligence to mount a rescue operation on Japan’s behalf, Japan can do little but express support diplomatically for the fight against terrorism. Looking forward, the best option may be for the Japanese government strengthen the working relationship between the SDF and NATO militaries as it has already sought to do over the last three to four years, since Japan is not likely to build the necessary power projection capabilities any time soon.
Domestic Repercussions
If the two men are executed, then immediate anger will probably strengthen Abe’s argument in the short-term that Japan needs to be more mindful of the international nature of threats to Japan’s security and the need to cooperate with the US and its allies.
If Japan had of been providing military aid to the region, then the narrative might have been different, and it could have hurt Abe. The fact that Japan was providing humanitarian aid and was still targeted will suggest that IS is a particularly dangerous and implacable adversary to the Japanese public. But I doubt that Japan will do much more than provide additional non-military and infrastructure aid at this point in response to the possible tragedy.
However, it will almost certainly inject energy and controversy into the drafting of Japan’s new security legislation later this year. Already, subsequent to the 2014 December election, the Komeito had extracted general commitments in negotiations from the LDP to effectively limit the geographic scope of new so-called “collective self-defense” legislation. Those who are already inclined to see any Japanese coordination with foreign militaries as a negative will see this as evidence of why Japan should continue to be circumspect about taking on a higher military profile, while those wanting to see a higher military profile will see this as evidence that Japan cannot afford to sit back and hope other nations can take care of Japan’s security and interests. It will be a source of controversy, which will probably be unwelcome for Abe as Abe lacks the political skill of Koizumi when it comes to managing the public on highly controversial issues of broad public concern such as Japan’s overseas military presence.
In the long-term, as the anger in Japan subsides, it could complicate the passage of defense legislation later this year if that legislation raises the possibility of Japan providing significant military aid to US and NATO operations in the Middle East. While the Japanese public is slowly becoming more comfortable with the SDF and the US military playing an increased role together in (East Asian) regional security, they are still very sceptical about some Japanese politicians’ claims that the Middle East also represents a pressing concern for Japan’s security requiring a Japanese military response, other than perhaps for protecting sea lanes from pirates. Komeito was probably the big winner from the recent election, and insiders have suggested this meant that one of more contentious pieces of legislation – Japanese minesweeping during an ongoing conflict (possibly in the Middle East) – will probably be off the table later this year. I wouldn’t be surprised if the long-term consequences on CSD legislation were minimal, especially since CSD operations have little to do with what might be required in the current situation.
There has been chatter that Abe might want to let the hostages die, as this might help his agenda for revising the constitution.
Leaving aside the cynicism inherent in such a suggestion, if the arguably more serious Algerian situation did not rouse the Japanese public to support changes allowing direct Japanese military intervention, it seems unlikely that this particular situation will galvanise it. The media impact of this event might be greater than Algeria, but as time passes, concern may subside.
Furthermore, the types of constitutional changes to Article 9 that could pass the Diet and public opinion at this point in time will fall far, far short of allowing high profile rescue operations inside the territory of other nations.
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