A Hiatus

I am coming to a crucial part of my PhD studies (the end) and I don’t have as much time to pay attention to the comings and goings of Japanese domestic politics right now. I will attempt to post something (or some things) just before the election later this year in July, but don’t be too surprised if there is little other than that.

I have jotted down a few thoughts at JSW regarding a recent NY Times article which had the rather unnecessary headline of “Japan Moving Further Away from Pacifism.”

It isn’t short, but if you have the time and interest, then by all means.

While it Has Gone Quiet within the Senkakus…

The PRC response has finally come through over the last 24 hours. But it has been unsatisfying and shaky, ranging from surprise, to righteous condemnation of Japan’s motives, declaring the incident to be an “absolute fabrication,” now to arguing that the MSDF was silly enough to mistake a surveillance/early warning radar for a fire control radar (that would be indeed be silly, since the Yudachi engaged in evasive manoeuvres to escape the Chinese frigate!)

The Japanese have dug their feet in first by saying that the Chinese response is simply not good enough and for them to go away and think about it more carefully. Then Minister of Defense Onodera has come out and suggested (日) that there was certainly no mistake and that they have video, photographic, and if needed, electronic evidence of the supposed infraction. Onodera argues that, a “normal” radar “spins” while it is monitoring while a fire-control radar continuously tracks the “target” as it moves. 「通常のレーダーはくるくる回って警戒監視をするが、火器管制レーダーはその(目標の)方向に向けてずっと追いかける」

He also said that in addition to the confirmation of this through visual imagery, they have electronic records as well which were carefully analysed by an expert at Yokosuka Naval Base on return. Onodera emphasised that a fire-control radar is a specialized radar that emits a type of electromagnetic wave with a distinctive wave frequency.  「電波を発する機械で、しかも(周波数などが)特殊なレーダーだ。それもしっかり記録しており、証拠として間違いない」

That said, the Japanese government is still considering releasing these records due to it possibly revealing sensitive national security information. It is understood that some in the MOD are not too keen to reveal more than images.

On the bright side, a number of Japanese news agencies have all noticed that PRC incursions around the Senkaku Islands themselves have reduced since the Japanese made their accusations. It will be interesting to see if they double down on the various broad accusations they have made, or whether they will approach the Japanese for a face-saving way out of the issue (for a price perhaps?)1. Or simply ignore it? (the “pfffft….whatever” strategy that the PRC uses when things are really tricky)

Extra:

Jun Okumura has also been putting up more timely analysis regarding the latest radar incident.

Kyle Mizokami has an interesting thought experiment up at JSW regarding what could have happened between the two vessels involved in the incident militarily, if you are that way inclined.

1 This price could be an agreement along the lines of an agreement not to do such things again in the future such as I mentioned Japan and Russia have agreed to (a tacit admission that that is what happened and removes that particular tactic from the PRC toolbox). Or the implementation of a maritime “hotline” mechanism which has been mooted over the last few years and was apparently making progress towards implementation before the Senkaku controversy erupted late last year. The PRC ambassador in Japan two days ago recognized (日) the need for such a mechanism. The one risk for the PRC with such a hotline is that if it is called upon it may reveal weaknesses and irregularities in terms of the political and military chain of command, a consideration very relevant if we assume that this recent incident is a PLA-level rather than Xi Jinping-level instigated incident. Okumura above even suggests that a dialing down, but not elimination, of Chinese government patrol boats entering into Senkaku waters may be possible, thereby killing two birds with one stone.

The New PRC Documents on the Senkaku Islands

As noted in my fuller exposition of the developments over at Japan Security Watch, Jiji Press went big yesterday (日) with apparently revelations that the Chinese, according to the PRC’s own official documents, actually considered the Senkaku Islands to be part of Okinawa prefecture for some period of time, in contradiction of its position that it had always considered the islands to be part of Taiwan “Province”, even before the 1968 discovery of oil.

In short, the article notes that in a document produced in preparation for negotiations regarding the San Fransisco Peace Treaty, (which the PRC did not ultimately participate in due to not being invited, and its outcome rejected anyway due to its position on Taiwan), the PRC did not once use the current Chinese name for the islands (Diaoyu-tai), used the Japanese moniker on one occasion, and did not explicitly state that they should have been part of PRC China while also expressing doubts about whether the islands were part of Taiwan province rather than the Ryukyus. This could have not only implications for the consistency of the PRC position since 1949, but raises the possibility that Chinese “awareness” that the islands were effectively ceded along with Taiwan during the Treaty of Shimonoseki, or stolen by conquest, was not as robust, apparent or widespread as has been previously argued. That said, the documents are not likely to change anything in the short-term, although may embolden the Japanese to take a more proactive position on promoting the idea of ICJ resolution.

Now for Something Completely Different: Kind Words for Abe Shinzo

After Abe Shinzo’s victory in the LDP presidential race, Japan Security Watch co-perpetrator James Simpson and I consoled ourselves on Twitter with recognition that while Abe may have been a failure (and indeed a potential danger) on the domestic front the first time around, his foreign and security policy accomplishments, aside from a few indiscrete remarks, were significant.

There is a tendency to see Japan’s foreign policy in the 21st century split between the “conservative nationalist” period which would cover the Koizumi, Abe and Aso cabinets, and the “Asianist” period with the LDP Fukuda interlude and the DPJ (or earlier to Obuchi if you want book ends). If one however pays attention to what was done, rather than what was said during the last 11 years, a more appropriate division could arguably be made between the Koizumi tenure and the post-Koizumi tenure, of which Abe ushered into existence.

The fact of the matter is is that Koizumi’s foreign policy was not only somewhat opportunistic but often unfocused. In terms of military and security policy, Koizumi dedicated Japan’s resources to inappropriate endeavours and his adminstration appeared to lack an articulated strategic focus other than to simply follow behind the US, something which ultimately overstretched the SDF’s resources and doctrinal coherence to the point of danger. Only, perhaps ironically, under the DPJ, are we seeing a more robust and focused consideration and debate in regards to what the SDF should be doing, rather than trying to do everything or anything that is politically expedient at the time. Koizumi also displaced Obuchi’s human security agenda from the centre of Japan’s foreign policy, at least rhetorically, seemingly on the basis of personal whim. This was an area of foreign policy endeavour where Japan was a global leader and one of great value in terms of Japan’s national interests in the strategically important Southeast Asia region. During Koizumi’s time in office Japan’s crediblity and influence in Southeast Asia fell to its lowest levels, while China was making significant strides precisely at this time. Despite this, Koizumi only visited Southeast Asia once during five years outside of multilateral forums and the like. Even when he did things right, like embracing Indonesia during the post-tsunami humanitarian crisis and during the subsequent crisis (and then peace-process) in Aceh, he failed in terms of follow up and ensuring Japan remained committed. Indeed, after making the initial running Japan meekly ceded a primary leadership role to Finland in Aceh. If Koizumi had of cared more about a coherent and consistent foreign policy in this critical region he may well have ended up with a Nobel Peace Prize as well as enhancing Japanese credibility in the region. The less said about Northeast Asia under Koizumi’s watch, the better, of course.

Abe on the other hand, while only in office one year, was much more focused in terms of foreign policy goals, and was generally constructive and effective. Japan security and geopolitical relations with many strategically critical nations for Japan such as India, Australia, and Vietnam actually went forward in concrete terms in all realms – diplomatic, economic and military. Relations with Northeast Asia, much to everyone’s surprise, stabilized and improved. Abe, and those who came after him, presided over actual progress being made on FTAs/EPAs in the region rather than simply engaging in rhetoric about “region building.” If one pays close attention to what has actually happened under the DPJ in terms of foreign policy, strategic and security policy developments, (that is, rather than being distracted by the diplomatic and political noise), then much of what the DPJ has done effectively in foreign and security policy, albeit quietly, is arguably a continuation and strengthening of tendencies and agendas initiated under the Abe regime.

While the above is somewhat oversimplified for the purposes of making clear that not all is what it seems, it is in this context that one can read fellow antipodean and friend of the show Andrew Levidis‘ articulate, balanced and unsentimental take (not a criticism) on what an Abe 2.0 administration might mean – something MTC was right to identify.

One paragraph in particular could well describe where the DPJ after three years has ended up in regards to foreign policy thinking:

Japan’s diplomatic strategy toward China during the Abe cabinet was symbolised by an ‘unsentimental perception of friendship’ in which China was ‘neither enemy, nor neutral nor friend’. As premier, Abe made the symbolic decision to visit Beijing, endorsed the official declaration of wartime aggression and accepted the creation of a Sino–Japanese history commission. Yet at the same time he rejected the link between anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and the so-called history problem, criticised China experts within Japan for their ‘excessive reactions’, warned of the instability within China from the loss of the philosophical paradigm of ‘equality of outcomes’, and warned of China’s rapid acquisition of military power.

This view would not be out of place among some of the junior and centrist elements of the DPJ, although this was not necessarily the case at the start of 2009. The irony is that Abe’s social and domestic agenda is anethema to many of these very same people, despite there being areas of linkage in the foreign and security policy dimension. Abe’s seeming contempt for the Japanese constitution, symbolized by the setting up of the ‘Yanai Committee’ to discuss how to “reinterpret” the constitution, is also viewed by many in the centre (of both parties) as cynical and contrary to the very spirit of democratic liberalism that Abe and other conservatives are keen to promote as the key difference between Japan and China.

The other issue is that the foreign policy Abe wanted to pursue, and the one he did pursue, may well have been quite different – such are the difficulties of being in a position of compromise and there is no necessary shame in that. However if is is indeed the case, as some have suggested, that Abe believes that the foreign policy he pursued while in office was too soft, rather than being somewhat competent, then this is indeed a troubling thought.

I will leave the last words to Andrew:

Shinzo Abe’s return to the presidency of the LDP and (potentially) to the Japanese premiership offers both opportunity and danger, and the degree to which he succeeds in reconciling the seeming contradictions within his vision will have a direct bearing upon Japan’s relations and role in Asia.

Noda’s Next Step: the TPP?

Below is the more detailed and longer version of my piece on Japan and the TPP published over at the East Asia Forum.

Speaking of publishing elsewhere, I also am making regular contributions to the Shingetsu News Agency’s news site. SNA is a foreign independent news agency in Japan- one of the few, but well needed. They cover a lot of Japan stories on the ground too, which is becoming less common for international media agencies – see some of their videos here.

There is of course also Japan Security Watch and Asia Security Watch. Anyway, enough of the PR!

Why the TPP will not be Noda’s next big challenge

International expectations of Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko’s administration seem to have increased greatly since his success in getting the consumption tax and related social security bills through the lower house late last month. Matthew P. Goodman a former White House coordinator for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), writing for the CSIS, argues that[1] Noda needs “to make one last push over the next few months to secure Japan’s economic future—and his own legacy as one of the most effective Japanese leaders of the postwar era.” The Financial Times’ Mure Dickie[2] also writes that “the black-belt judo enthusiast should not be satisfied with a tax rise as his only legacy,” and along with Goodman suggests that Japanese commitment to joining TPP negotiations should be one of Noda’s main goals going forward.

Certainly Noda has been by the most effective of the (3) DPJ prime ministers. Unlike his predecessors Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto, Noda has remained focused by taking on one policy challenge at a time, and has been calm, resolute and consistent in articulating his rationale for addressing said policy problem. He has avoided needlessly alienating supporters and potential allies, and most importantly, has focused pressure on his adversaries’ weaknesses and vulnerabilities in order to drag them into reluctantly supporting his policy program. While he stumbled in his first few months, he has managed to retain influence in articulating the narrative surrounding the “meaning” of his premiership, something that Hatoyama and Kan both lost early on in their tenures.

If one accepts the above evaluation of the Noda regime, then it would not be unreasonable to think that Noda may well have one or two more policy successes up his sleeve. Noda, and the DPJ, certainly need more than the single, unpopular success of raising the consumption tax to fight the next election on the basis of ‘effective leadership.’ Given that Noda identified joining the TPP as a priority late last year it is therefore natural to speculate that Noda may push forward with a bold Japanese bid to join the growing list of TPP nations in time for September’s APEC meeting in Vladivostok.

There are however many reasons why the TPP will not take a prominent place in Noda’s thinking over the next few months. Aside from the recent challenges surrounding the political management of his much reduced lower house majority, Noda will find pushing forward on the TPP much less attractive than he would have late last year. At the time, Noda found a proactive approach towards the TPP useful as it allowed Japan to temporarily take the focus off Futenma in the, at the time, troubled US-Japan relationship. It also seemed to stimulate Chinese interest in looking at pushing ahead with a trilateral trade agreement with Korea and Japan, giving Japan some diplomatic space for maneuver. This, Noda would have hoped, would have reduced the risk of foreign policy undermining his ability to push forward on domestic issues such as happened with his two immediate predecessors.

However much has changed since then making pushing forward on TPP even more unpalatable than it would normally be as a policy issue to burnish his credentials as a persistent, pragmatic and effective political executive. This time it is not Japan’s hesitancy to take on small but powerful political interest groups, but the US domestic situation that seems to be the biggest barrier to Japan’s entering TPP negotiations. In late May the United States gave a signal that it would start pressing Japan to reduce the nontariff barriers to car imports in talks over Japan’s participation in the TPP. [3] Then came news that the US required concessions in six areas related to automobiles before allowing Japan to join TPP negotiations. The necessary concessions would include relaxation of technological, ecological and safety standards, tax treatment for different engine displacements, and concessions on customer service and distribution. [4]

However Japanese industry reacted with incredulity to both the suggestion that Japan’s automobile market was a closed one and to the unreasonableness of what Goodman curiously describes as “token concessions.” Toyoda Akio, the head of Japan’s automobile industry association and president of Toyota Motor Corp., told the Japanese media that he was “greatly confused” by US requests. He declared that “Japan is an open market without any restrictions on imported vehicles and without any tariffs (on those imports),” and called for an “open dialogue based on facts.”[5] Toyoda also pointed out that Japanese car manufacturers were already having a hard enough time with the extremely strong yen and the weak dollar, something that should have seen US car manufacturers become much more competitive in the Japanese domestic market. The Japanese side argues that poor sales of US cars in Japan are the fault of US automakers and note that there are higher sales of foreign cars in Japan’s domestic market, just not American cars.

Looking at the Japanese media it appears that it has become conventional wisdom in Japan that accusations of Japanese protectionism and demands for unreasonable concessions are ironically part of a US auto industry strategy to maintain US tariffs, currently set at 2.5 percent on imported passenger cars and 25 percent for trucks.  Believing that the Japanese will not accede to these demands, the goal, it would appear to the Japanese, is no more than the exclusion of Japan from the TPP, or the US receiving an exemption for its auto industry – something that would only take place if Japan received a similar exemption for its own sensitive agricultural sector.

At about the same time as Toyoda’s remarks, METI Minister Edano met with U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk on the sidelines of an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting of trade ministers in Kazan, Russia.  The Asahi Shimbun reported that a Japanese source had said the talks had turned into a “game of chicken,” with both sides refusing to back down, despite the Edano-Kirk meeting lasting 20 minutes longer than the expected 45 minutes. [6]

On June 14, Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs who accompanied Edano to the Kazan meeting, told a lower house agriculture committee that there was little hope for Japan being accepted into the TPP until after the US presidential election. [7] This is due to political sensitivities surrounding the US automobile industry’s influence in crucial swing states. Noda at the same time stated that he was not going to force a decision on joining the TPP by the then upcoming G20 meeting, [8] suggesting that a decision would be put off further. While some Japanese media outlets such as the Yomiuri lamented the possibility that Japan would be left behind when Mexico, and then Canada – both countries that declared their interest around the same time Noda did in November last year – announced that they would accept an invitation to join TPP negotiations during the mid-June G20 conference, [9] the Japanese government seemed to be unmoved. After a 19th June cabinet meeting Edano said in response to news of Mexico joining that “every country’s situation and conditions are different, and there is a need to continue to investigate and discuss with internal stakeholders.”[10]

The Japanese government’s suspicions were confirmed at the end of June. First US presidential candidate Mitt Romney, reacting to pressure from the three biggest automakers stated that he did not support Japanese participation in the TPP “at this time.”[11] Later US Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio introduced legislation “aimed at preventing a new Pacific trade agreement from harming auto employment.”  Then 132 House of Representatives’ Democrats (about two-thirds of the caucus) also sent a letter demanding more transparency and better consideration of US stakeholders’ interests to USTR’s Ron Kirk. This coincided with an energized effort by US automakers to put pressure on Washington to not let Japan join talks on the TPP. For example Ford’s vice president of international government affairs Stephen Biegun declared that “It is just simply wrong the decision to put in that discussion a country which is demonstrably protected and closed to American exports.” [12]

While the Japanese auto industry rejected the claims by Ford in particular, arguing that Ford had “chosen to essentially withdraw from the Japanese market” and refused “to seriously compete there,” the fact remains that Japan is did not participate in the 13th round of TPP negotiations in San Diego taking place now, and is unlikely to participate in negotiations in the near future. Those calling for Japan’s immediate entry into the TPP in order to reinvigorate its economy, and for Noda to expend political capital on this goal, need to consider how disastrous it would be for Noda to pursue TPP accession under the current conditions and limitations.

There also needs to be more balanced discussion on what the real factors that are obstacles to Japan joining the TPP. One such factor is that it is not just the Japanese domestic political situation that is an obstacle to strengthening the multilateral trade order in the Asia-Pacific. Neither is it that the Japanese are still necessarily hostile to entering trade agreements with countries with sensitive sectors as seems to have been the case in the past. In the last three years the Japanese have made small but positive steps towards furthering discussions and negotiations to enter economic partnership agreements with nations such as China, Korea, Australia, the EU, and most recently, Canada, in addition to completing agreements with Switzerland, Peru, Vietnam and India. Politically, while the current group of national politicians is still undecided on the merits of free trade, supporters of administrative reform such as Hashimoto Toru are very much, in principle, in favour of increasing trade relations and Japan’s economic internationalization. Aside from MAFF and affiliated organizations, within Japanese officialdom there is increasing openness to liberalizing trade relations and indeed some see it as vital.

Nevertheless, the Japanese focus will remain in the medium-term on forging trade agreements with those nations where the benefits are most clear, and not with countries which insist on “protection” for not only industry interests in their own countries, but are also essentially demanding “protection” in the domestic markets of others, such as we are seeing in the US automaker’s case.


Japan’s Regional Security Environment and Possibilities for Conflict

The next 5 months could be one of high drama and tension in East Asia geopolitics due to various leadership transitions and elections. In South Korea we have already seen election year sensitivities coming to have real life policy consequences with the last-minute cancellation of the ACSA/GSOMIA military accords between Japan and the ROK. With the presidential election due to be held in December 2012 this might just be the first in a series of tensions between Japan and South Korea, or even between the ROK and the US. North Korean leaders are also the masters of milking the US presidential season for concessions by simultaneously escalating tensions and negotiating for their deescalation.

The US presidential and congressional elections take place in November this year, which will constrain President Barack Obama on issues such as North Korea, Iran, and the TPP, and will likely push him to take tougher positions on China-related issues such as human rights, currency manipulation and adherence to WTO rules. China will also undergo a leadership change around November this year, and although the top two positions of CCP General Secretary (and eventually PRC president) and Party Secretary (and eventually Premier) of the State Council appear to be relatively safe for Xi Jinping and Le Keqiang, the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee could well change depending on internal CCP politics around internal and external events. It is important to bear in mind that the slowdown in the Chinese economy that is currently taking place could make this a more sensitive time than normal for the PRC. This sensitivity could be exacerbated by Sino-American relations. Every president since Nixon has essentially found it useful to take a tougher line on China in their first term. Some have speculated this is because of the lack of a working relationship and distrust between Chinese leaders and a new US administration, and the general demands of reelection politics. Human rights, trade, and Taiwan/North Korea issues generally tend to pop up as critical issues around US election time and the administration in power cannot be seen to be taking a soft line towards China. Of course this is simply not just about the US. When the PRC undergoes its sensitive 10-yearly leadership transition analysts have pointed out that actors other than the core CCP leadership tend to have their influence augmented and reflected more in PRC foreign policy and diplomacy. The PLA and the SOE sector of the economy for example tend to have greater influence during this period. With these two pivotal events for Sino-American relations taking place in exactly the same month tensions are sure to rise, and the possibility for diplomatic conflict or worse cannot be ruled out. Recent tensions over the South China Sea may well have set the tone for the next 5 months or more.

Then there is Japan. While Japan’s House of Representatives election does not have to be held until the middle of next year there has been some talk about a November date, after the ruling DPJ and the opposition LDP’s internal party elections. Given the various inter- and intra-party interests this seems quite plausible, although far from determined. From the foreign policy view this could add to diplomatic tensions in East Asia. For Noda Yoshihiko the main goal before then will be for him to suck as much oxygen out of his opponents’ likely election platforms by either appealing to his opponents to work together on these platforms in the interim, or taking them on as his own.

Indeed there are signs of such a strategy being implemented. Noda is continuing to support the Osaka-mayor backed development of legislation to turn the Osaka region into a Metropolitan administrative district similar to Tokyo. While Noda is unlikely to decisively agree to Japan’s joining TPP negotiations, he will continue to fly the TPP flag – another policy interest of Mayor Hashimoto Toru and his reformist One Osaka (Ishin no Kai) party. Both the One Osaka party and the LDP have identified in their policy statements a desire to change Japan’s disposition towards defense and collective self-defense in particular – the LDP through the dubious mechanism of “constitutional reinterpretation” and Hashimoto through a constitutional amendment to Article 9. Noda has in the last week identified discussion on the interpretation of collective self-defense as something he wants to push forward in the current parliamentary session, particularly as it pertains to defense of US ships on the high seas and Japan’s use of its BMD system to  defend the US from ballistic missile attack. Finally, Noda has also pushed forward on the previously identified proposal of ‘nationalizing’ the Senkaku Islands, where the government takes over ownership from the current private owner. This is clearly focused on taking a little wind out of Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro’s sails – something that Ishihara furiously alluded to in public. It is also a reasonably popular policy which will do no harm to Noda assuming he acts in a more decisive way than Kan Naoto’s administration did when faced with Chinese pressure over the islands.

The Noda administration’s other objective will be to relieve itself of as much pressure as possible from external sources as well. US-Japan relations could become a source of tension due to a number of issues. First there is the ongoing issue over the Futenma Replacement Facility. Second there is the continuing controversy and diplomatic friction over the deployment of the unpopular Ospreys to both Okinawa and Japan’s mainland. Third, there is the TPP, where arguments for Japan to enter negotiations have become weaker giving recent US demands. Noda is in an impossible situation in regards to all of these issues, given how politically vulnerable he now is in terms of both the upper and lower house numbers (as any subsequent prime minister will be without a solid majority in the Diet). In the short-term the best that Noda can do is state that he is committed to pushing forward with the policies, and hope that US election politics mercifully distracts Washington DC.

Noda’s plan to discuss collective self-defense may also have an external facing dimension. Given Noda’s political acumen, it would not be a surprise to find out that he is using such discussions as a hedge against Chinese escalation of the Senkaku Islands dispute that is likely to come about should Noda’s “nationalization” plan come to fruition in the next few months. While the CCP can be unpredictable in terms of how they react to certain sensitive diplomatic issues, the party leadership, and likely the PLA, will be united in not wanting to see Japan take on a more proactive military stance. The CCP at least still takes a realist approach to its foreign policy thinking, and the one thing they will not want to see, now that the strategic “distraction” of Taiwan has been somewhat dampened in the interim, is Japan rising to become a full strategic competitor in the East Asia region. A change in Japan’s collective self-defense doctrine would portend such a development for the Chinese leadership. The Chinese will be all the more wary given Japan’s recent activities in strengthening relations with its ASEAN partners. Not wanting to give the Japanese government a good excuse to go forward with changes in Japan’s security doctrine, the CCP may well tone down its ‘outrage’ over the nationalization of the Senkakus, assuming that the more hardline policies such as the stationing of the SDF of the islands, as proposed by Ishihara Shintaro, are not entertained. If more hard-line ‘nationalist’ elements in the CCP, or in the PLA in particular, take advantage of the more permissive pre-leadership transition political environment and move to escalate the issue then Noda possibly figures that he can make some political capital out of that as well, depending on the nature of the escalation.

The above is perhaps a somewhat cynical reading of the current geopolitical environment and internal politics of various regional actors. There are promising developments such as the potential (日) restarting of trade talks between Japan and the ROK, and Japan’s likely participation in three-way talks on a NE Asia trade bloc with China and the ROK. There may even be some coming together over North Korea and a restart of the six-party talks given China’s increasing displeasure with the DPRK. These will all have great long-term significance if they come to fruition. However in the short-term one should expect tension to be the norm rather than the exception. This coming together of domestic politics and external developments in putting pressure on various governments, which will need to be mediated through sensitive East Asian publics, means that avoidance of such tensions will likely require skillful behind-the-scenes diplomacy until at least early 2013.

Japan to start exporting arms by 2012?

I have a post up at Japan Security Watch looking at a report that was released yesterday that argues for a relaxation of the current arms export restrictions Japan has.

In other news, go here for a good concise run down of ex-Reconstruction Minister Matsumoto Ryu’s weirdness.

For those who are not well disposed towards reading, here is PressTV’s report on the situation. Includes Koizumi Shinjiro FWIW.

The LDP’s least insufferable member Kono Taro has been suspended from all executive LDP party positions for about one year. The LDP senior leadership has been suggesting again the possibility of a “grand coalition,”  with the DPJ to extend its life, which along with the situation around the Hamada expulsion, and the suspensions/punishment of those that voted to extend the Diet session like Kono, is likely to lead to tension in the party.  As suggested before, the LDP could be in for a rough period – discussions about party reform, including the killing off of party factions for once and for all, has seemingly stalled and senior party officials nixed the idea. The party has committed to reconsidering its policy on nuclear power, but who knows if that is genuine or a temporary measure to placate the public and/or those interested in renewable energy within the party.  Time will tell. In fact the party couldn’t even come to an agreement on whether to make the LDP building a no-smoking area – an internal party decision was overturned by its Vice-President Oshima who was having none of that.

It would be worthy of derision, if it wasn’t for the equally sad and significantly more consequential problems the ruling DPJ is facing as a party.

Update: Japan has indeed since subsequently relaxed the restrictions on arms’ exports. Please see here for detailed background, and here for translation of, and commentary on, the document.

Duelling Perspectives

Japan Security Watch has a couple of posts based on a Dispatch Japan article by Peter Ennis, and a piece published by the CSIS under its Japan Chair Platform. These are both on the Futenma problem and have a very different view on recent events and what the issue really is with force realignment. I have provided a response at JSW to the CSIS article here. The originals are here for Peter Ennis, and here for CSIS.